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I. INTRODUCTION 
A podiatrist performs unnecessary surgeries and defrauds Blue 
Cross when receiving payment for the surgeries. Following indict-
ment for mail fraud, the podiatrist settles with the Government 
and with Blue Cross agreeing to pay a $26,000 fine and $160,000 in 
restitution to the insurer. What are the income tax consequences? 
Undoubtedly, the podiatrist must include in his taxable income 
in the year received the amount paid to him by Blue Cross because 
according to the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") taxable in-
come includes "income from whatever source derived. III When the 
podiatrist later pays the $26,000 fine and the $160,000 payment in 
restitution, may he deduct either in calculating taxable income? 
For expenses to be deductible, they affirmatively must be "ordi-
nary and necessary expenses" paid "in carrying on any trade or 
business."2 In addition, the expense must not fall within any of 
several affirmative disallowances. Section 162(f) of the Code pro-
vides that "no deduction shall be allowed ... for any fine or simi-
lar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law."S 
1 I.R.C. § 61. In James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), the Court conclusively es-
tablished that gains from illegal activity are taxable income. 
• I.R.C. § 162(a}. 
• I.R.C. § 162(0. Section 162(0 disallows a deduction. However, an expense that does not 
fall within the disallowance is not automatically deductible. It must also be an ordinary and 
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Consequently, the podiatrist may not deduct the fine, but what 
about the restitutionary payment? Several interpretative issues 
immediately arise: is the restitution a "fine?"; is it a "similar pen-
alty?"; is it "paid to a government?" 
In a second case; an investment banking firm announces that it 
has discovered that it committed irregularities and rule violations 
relating to auctions of U.S. Treasury securities. The United States 
Government investigates, and the firm agrees to pay $290 million 
in settlement of various civil claims without admitting or denying 
the government's allegations. Is the $290 million payment a "fine" 
or "similar penalty?" 
Both of the above scenarios are actual cases and are the most 
recent reported examples of potential applications of section 162(0 
of the Code. The podiatrist's case was litigated in the Sixth Cir-
cuit, and the split decision of the three-judge panel offered no in-
sight towards the section 162(f) issue. Rather, the case was decided 
under a different section of the Code.· Other circuits that have in-
terpreted section 162(f) disagree on whether restitution is deducti-
ble in light of section 162(f). The Second Circuit concluded that 
restitution almost always is deductible while the Ninth Circuit 
concludes that it almost always is not. The inconsistent manner in 
which the courts have handled the deductibility of restitution will 
be analyzed in Part IV of this Article. 
The second case involved Salomon Inc.5 Congress investigated 
the deductibility of the $290 million settlement payment, but the 
Treasury would not address the particular case before Congress. 
The Treasury stated only that deductibility of civil penalties is a 
necessary expense paid in carrying on a trade or business. In other words, the expense must 
meet the demands of § 162(a) of the Code. However, because the focus of this Article is 
§ 162(0, I hereafter ignore the § 162(a) issue. Thus if an expense is not barred from deduc-
tion under § 162(0, it will be considered deductible and thus implicitly meets § 162(a). 
• See Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1993). Curiously for a circuit court, 
the three-judge panel produced three separate opinions. The court affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of Dr. Kraft's deduction of the restitution paid to Blue Cross but offered 
no holding with respect to § 162(0. Instead, the decision is based upon § 1341, which gov-
erns deductions when the income and associated deductions occur in different taxable years. 
Under § 1341, the original receipt of income must be under a "claim of right." Kraft had no 
claim of right because he knew that he illegally procured the reimbursements from Blue 
Cross. The panel did not reach the § 162(0 issue. 
• Securities and Exchange Commission v. Salomon Inc and Salomon Brothers Inc, 92 Civ. 
No. 3691 (RPP) (S.D.N.Y. 1992), Securities and Exchange Commission Litigation Release 
No. 13,246 (May 20, 1992), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Litrel File. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Va. Tax Rev. 274 1993-1994
274 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 13:271 
gray area depending upon whether the payments were "punitive" 
or "remedial" in nature and defined neither term. Salomon's finan-
cial statements disclose that the company deducted a substantial 
portion of the $290 million payment. Part IV of this Article de-
scribes the Salomon settlement and how section 162(0 applies to 
the transaction. 
Part II of this Article demonstrates that the determinative issue 
in section 162(0 cases is whether the payment was intended ·to 
punish the payor. 8 To make this decision, courts have engaged in 
an unarticulated hierarchical analysis of three factors: 1) legislative 
intent with respect to the claim under which the government ac-
ted; 2) the facts and Circumstances specific to the case; and 3) the 
method for calculating damages under the claim. However, no 
court yet has expressly acknowledged that its analysis is hierarchi-
cal. Part III discerns the hierarchy from the cases, demonstrates 
that it comports with the congressional intent behind section 
162(0, and suggests that courts use the hierarchical analysis in a 
. fashion consistent with other doctrines involving state-invoked 
punishments by civil law.? Consistent treatment of civil law pun-
ishments will illuminate the gray area currently clouding the appli-
cation of section 162(0, and will require courts to define any "not-
remedial" exaction as punishment.8 The current application of sec-
• The Supreme Court did not expressly approve punishment by civil law until 1989. See 
infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. Congress and the Treasury had denied income tax 
deductions for state-invoked punitive civil sanctions since 1971, thereby demonstrating a 
recognition of punishment by civil law substantially predating the Supreme Court's ap-
proval of punitive civil sanctions. The lower federal courts denied these deductions even 
earlier. 
7 Only state-invoked punishments fall within § 162(0's disallowance because the amount 
of the punishment must be paid to a government. Punitive damages paid in a suit between 
private parties thereby escape § 162(0 and may be deductible. See infra note 19. This stat-
utory distinction created for tax purposes mirrors the sharp distinction drawn for constitu-
tional law purposes between state-invoked punitive civil sanctions and punitive damages 
awarded in civil suits between private parties. For example, in Browning-Ferris Indus. v. 
Kelco Disposal, Inc., ~92 U.S. 257 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment's Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to private punitive damages. But see Austin v. 
United States, 113 S. Ct .. 2801 (1993), where the Court concluded that state-invoked civil 
punishments, such as a civil forfeiture of property, are subject to the Excessive Fines 
Clause. 
S The Supreme Court has decided that, for Fifth Amendment purposes, a civil sanction 
punishes to the extent that the sanction "may not fairly be characterized as remedial." 
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (holding that, while civil sanctions may 
punish, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits them from punish-
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tion 162(f) permits courts to construe punishment more expan-
sively, and some interpret "not-compensatory" as punitive.s 
An exaction is remedial if it. constitutes payment of less than "all 
the government's costs" resulting from the acts giving rise to the 
remedy.lO "Costs" are defined broadly and include, in addition to 
traditional compensatory damages, damages under double-dam-
ages-plus~fixed-penalty provisions, damages for the government's 
investigative and prosecutorial costs, and damages recovered by 
the government on account of a third party's costs.ll The outer 
limit of "costs" may be the aggregate external social costs created 
by the payor. 
The "remedial" construction of when the payment of damages to 
a government is punitive is considerably narrower than the defini-
tion applied by courts and administrative agencies deciding tax 
cases. Consequently, a taxpayer remitting damages to a govern-
ment that are "more-than-compensatory" but that reimburse the 
government for less than uall the government's costs" appears to 
lose a tax deduction because he is being punished. Yet the tax-
payer is not regarded as punished for other purposes - such as his 
Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy or his Eighth 
Amendment protection against excessive fines. This result is not 
only unfair, it is inconsistent with the legislative history of section 
162(0. 
ing a convicted defendant a second time). The remedy sought is critical to determining the 
nature of a legal action in various circumstances. For example, depending on the remedy, an 
action is either a suit at law or one in equity, thereby determining whether a jury trial is 
required under the Seventh Amendment. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1987) 
(identifying as relevant two factors in the jury trial determination, the nature of the action 
and the nature of the remedy sought, but also noting that a characterization of the relief 
sought is more important than an "abstruse historical" search for the nearest 18th-century 
analog). Similarly, the focus on remedy to decide the purpose of a legal action exists in other 
areas of the tax law. In Burke v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1867 (1992), the Court concluded 
that an action is a tort for purposes of section 104(a)(2) of the Code only if the remedy 
available to the plaintiff includes a broad range of damages. 
• See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
10 Halper, 490 U.S. at 449. 
11 Id. at 443-46. 
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II. DENIAL OF TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR "FINES AND SIMILAR 
PENALTIES" 
A. The Public Policy Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions 
Prior to the enactment of section 162(f) of the Code in 1969, the 
federal courts had no statutory authority to deny income tax de-
ductions for fines or similar payments. However, courts did deny 
deductions for fines and other objectionable expenses on public 
policy grounds. The Board of Tax Appeals originated the "public 
, policy disallowance" in 1924 by denying a deduction for expenses 
incurred in successfully defending a perjury indictment.12 The 
court reasoned that expenses involved in the commission of illegal 
acts are not "ordinary and necessary."18 However, lower courts 
have also applied the public policy disallowance under other Code 
sections which do not require that preclusion of loss and personal 
deductions be based on whether such deductions are "ordinary" or 
"necessary."14 The public policy disallowance thereby extended to 
more than particular statutory language like "ordinary'" or "neces-
sary." It was used as a free-wheeling sword to strike at any per-
ceived tax "benefit" arising from malicious conduct. 
As such, the public policy disallowance embodied a fundamental 
tension in income tax policy between neutral economic principles 
(which require that, in calculating taxable income, all expenses in-
curred in earning income are deductible regardless of merit) and 
social policy objectives (which examine the merit of the expenses 
incurred). When enacting the modern income tax in 1913, Congress 
clearly chose neutral economic policies. Senator Williams, who was 
in charge' of the bill, remarked, "the object of this bill is to tax a 
.. Backer .v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924). But note that in 1966, the Supreme 
Court rejected the reasoning in Backer concluding that expenses incurred by a taxpayer 
when unsuccessfully defending a criminal prosecution were deductible as ordinary and nec-
essary business expenses. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966) ("No public 
policy is offended when a man faced with serious criminal charges employs a lawyer to help 
in his defense. That is not 'proscribed conduct.' It is his constitutional right."). Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.162-21(b)(2) codifies Tellier. ' 
18 Backer, 1 B.T.A. at 216 ("It would be an anachronism to say that such an act, so inimi-
cal to the public interest as to justify punishment for its commission, may at the same time 
be so recognized that the expense involved in its commission is sanctioned by the revenue 
law as an ordinary and necessary expense of carrying on a business."). 
,. John Y. Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes, and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 
Tax L. Rev. 611, 614 (1970). 
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man's net income; [i]t is not to reform men's moral charac-
ters .... "111 Congress rejected amendments that would have lim-
ited deductions to those incurred in a lawful trade or business. IS 
Courts, however, have been more favorably disposed to the social 
policy effects of the tax law, perhaps because they, unlike Con-
gress, must face specific facts head-on and cannot realistically 
grant the "benefit" of a tax deduction for socially objectionable 
behavior. 
B. Internal Revenue Code Section 162(1) 
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress reasserted its view that 
public policy "generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify 
the disallowance of deductions"17 specifically allowed by the Code. 
Through codification of four specific applications of the public pol-
icy disallowance, Congress usurped the courts' authority to deny 
deductions on public policy grounds.18 One of the four types of ex-
.. 50 Congo Rec. 3849 (1913) (quoted in Tellier, 383 U.S. at 691-92). 
11 Tellier, 383 U.S. at 691. 
17 Senate Comm. on Finance, Tax Reform Act of 1969, S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 274 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2311, and in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 597. 
Proponents of public policy considerations often pressure Congress to increase the number 
of ordinary and necessary expenses that are disallowed a deduction. For example, witnesses 
before the House Ways and Means Committee recently suggested that taxpaYljrs be denied 
deductions for "environmentally destructive business behavior." U.S. Economy, and Propos-
als to Provide Middle-Income Tax Relief, Tax Equity and Fairness, Economic Stimulus and 
Growth: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 
1488-99 (1992) (Statement of Dawn Erlandson, Director of Tax Policy, Friends of the 
Earth). 
18 S. Rep. No. 552, supra note 17, at 273-76, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2310-13 
and in 1969-3 C.B. at 596-98 ("The provision for the denial of the deduction for payments in 
these situations which are deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive. 
Public policy, in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify 
the disallowance of deductions. "). 
This idea is incorporated in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) which states in pertinent part: "A 
deduction for an expense paid or incurred after December 30, 1969, which would otherwise 
be allowable under section 162 shall not be denied on the grounds that allowance of such 
deduction would frustrate a sharply defined public policy." The lower federal courts inter-
pret the constraint upon them as narrowly as possible concluding that it pertains only to 
§ 162, and thus the public policy disallowance lives on in every other section of the Code. 
Some courts even ignore the constraint with respect to § 162. In Car-Ron Asphalt Paving 
CO. V. Commissioner, 758 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1985), affg 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1314 (1983), the 
court disallowed, as not "necessary," deductions for kickbacks permitted under § 162(c). 
The Car-Ron decision not only ignored the 1969 Senate Report and the Treasury Regula-
tions, but seemed to contradict an earlier decision of the same circuit court. In Raymond 
Bertolini Trucking CO. V. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'g 45 T.C.M. 
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penditures denied deduction by Congress was "any fine or similar 
penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law."19 
In describing the scope of the disallowance, the Senate Finance 
Committee Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (the "1969 Sen-
ate Report") provided that "[t]his provision is to apply in any case 
in which the taxpayer is required to pay a fine because he is con-
victed of a crime (felony or misdemeanor) in a full criminal pro-
ceeding in an appropriate court. This represents a codification of 
the general court position."20 Interestingly, although the statute 
(CCH) 44 (1982), the Sixth Circuit had allowed deductions for kickbacks paid to the same 
person whom Car-Ron had paid. The Court in Bertolini Trucking, however, could not rule 
01). whether or not the expenses were "necessary" because the Internal Revenue Service had 
already conceded that issue. 
,. I.R.C. § 162(0. The other three types of payments denied deduction were: (1) two-
thirds of treble damages payments u.nder the antitrust laws following a related criminal 
violation; (2) deductions for bribes paid to public officials; and (3) other unlawful bribes or 
kickbacks. I.R.C. §§ 162(c), (g). Note that punitive damages paid to a private plaintiff ("pri-
vate punitive damages") were not included in the disallowances and are deductible provided 
the expense meets the other requirements of deductibility (i.e., expense is incurred in a 
trade or business and not subject to capitalization). See Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57 
(holding private punitive damages deductible). 
At fust' blush, it appears inconsistent that private damages are deductible while civil dam-
ages paid to a government as punishment ("public punitive damages") are not. However, 
such inconsistency can be reconciled with the tax law's general treatment of payments 
tainted by illegality. The distinction between private and public punitive damages for de-
duction purposes mirrors the distinction which permits deductions for expenditures made in 
connection with illegal business but disallows deductions for fines. In cases decided the 
same day, the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), allowed de-
ductions for rent and wages incurred in conducting a bookmaking business, but, in Tank 
Truck Rentals v. United States, 356 U.S. 30 (1958), disallowed deductions for fines. In Sulli-
van, no government was a party to the transaction. (While governments have made book-
making illegal in general, no government had yet brought an action specifically against Sul-
livan.) Conversely, in Tank Truck Rentals, a government brought an action specifically 
against the trucking company. It would be inconsistent for a government to punish an indi-
vidual, yet allow the benefit of a tax deduction; therefore, Sullivan gets the tax deduction 
and the trucking company does not. Perhaps, only when the "conflict" rises to that level 
does Congress want to deviate from the net .income tax. 
Thus, the tax treatment differs depending on whether a government has acted in a spe-
cific case against a specific taxpayer or has acted in a more general manner (e.g., byoutlaw-
ing bookmaking or establishing a regime of civil punitive damages). This difference explains 
other types of tax cases as well. For example, a taxpayer is allowed to depreciate illegally 
possessed slot machines up to the date of seizure, Rev. Rul. 74-528, 1974-2 C.B. 64, and is 
entitled to a cost of goods sold deduction when calculating gain upon the sale of slot ma-
chines, Rev. Rul. 74-531, 1974-2 C.B. 268. However, upon seizure he is denied a loss deduc-
tion under § 165 because the allowance of a deduction would violate public policy. Rev. Rul. 
77-126, 1977-1 C.B. 47-48.' 
I. S. Rep. No. 552, supra note 17, at 274, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2311-12, and 
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denied the availability of a deduction for both "fines" and "similar 
penalties," the legislative history addressed only criminal fines. 
Two issues immediately arose: does section 162(f) apply to civil ex-
actions, and if so, to which civil exactions does it apply? 
Shortly after the enactment of the Tax Reform Act, an article by 
Professor John Taggart appeared presenting the arguments for and 
against narrowly reading section 162(f) to apply only to criminal 
fines.21 Taggart argues that if section 162(f) is construed to extend 
to civil exactions, then it should deny deduction only of civil exac-
tions intended to punish the payor. Taggart illustrates that defini-
tion by example, distinguishing "additions to tax" from another 
type of exaction - "penalties" for failure to comply with the 
Code's substantive requirements. He contends that the "additions 
to tax," found in subchapter A of chapter 68 of the Code, should 
be deductible because they clearly are not punishment. In contrast, 
assessable penalties exacted under subchapter B of chapter 68 are 
intended to punish and; therefore, should not be deductible.22 For 
support, Taggart cites Helvering v. Mitchell,28 where the Supreme 
Court held that the "addition to tax" charged as a result of fraudu-
lent deficiencies in federal income tax with intent to evade tax2• 
was not double jeopardy to a taxpayer acquitted of criminal tax 
in 1969-3 C.B. at 597 .. 
11 Taggart, supra note 14, at 649. Taggart traces the development of the general public 
policy disallowance from its inception through its codification by the Tax Reform Act of 
1969. In contrast, this Article's analysis begins with the enactment of § 162(0 by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, referring to pre-1969 authorities only to the extent that they have been 
used to construe § 162(0. For the history of the enactment of § 162(0, see id. at 612-18, 
638-45 . 
•• "Additions to tax" include exactions for failures to file certain tax returns, information 
returns, and registration statements; for failures to pay income, stamp, and estimated tax; 
for tendering bad checks to the Internal Revenue Service; and for inaccuracies in tax returns 
attributable to negligence or fraud. "Assessable penalties" include exactions for willful at-
tempts to evade tax, for failures to file certain information returns, for understatements of 
tax liability by income tax return preparers, for promoting abusive tax shelters, for filing 
frivolous income tax returns, for aiding and abetting understatements of tax liability, for 
failing to maintain certain records, lind for failing to disclose certain matters . 
•• 303 U.S. 391 (1938) . 
•• This sanction is usually termed a civil fraud penalty. Presently, 75% of that portion of 
the underpayment attributable to fraud is added to a taxpayer's liability. I.R.C. § 6663(a). 
That addition is a chapter 68, subchapter A "addition to tax" for which the Government has 
the burden of proof. I.R.C. § 7454(a) ("In any proceeding involving the issue whether the 
petitioner has been guilty of fraud with intent to evade tax, the burden of proof in respect 
of such issue shall be upon the Secretary [of the Treasury)"). 
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fraud. 2G Taggart asserts that because the civil fraud penalty was 
not punishment for purposes of double jeopardy, it is not a "fine or 
similar penalty" for purposes of section 162(f) of the Code.26 
C. Treasury Regulations Promulgated Under Section 162({) 
On· May 27, 1971 the Treasury, by regulation, interpreted section 
162(f) of the Code to include civil penalties thereby unambiguously 
rejecting the narrow interpretation of section 162(f) as applying 
only to criminal fines. In pertinent part, the regulatory definition 
included an amount "paid as a civil penalty imposed by Federal, 
State, or locallaw."27 In a memorandum from the Commissioner of 
the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") to the Assistant Sec-
retary of the Treasury, the Service, which drafted the regulations, 
explained that "[a]lthough an inference may be made from a state-
ment in the Senate Finance Committee report that a criminal con-
viction is required for section 162(f) to apply, it has been con-
cluded that this statement should be interpreted as only an 
example of one of the situations to which that section applies."28 
•• Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 398, 401 (concluding that the civil fraud penalty was not intended 
as punishment but as a remedial exaction to reimburse the Government for the heavy ex-
pense of investigation and loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud) . 
•• Taggart, supra note 14, at 640 . 
.. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21 (b)(2), 36 Fed. Reg 9637, 9639 (May 27, 1971). The full 
definition was as follows: 
Id. 
(b) Definition. For purposes of this section a fine or similar penalty includes an 
amount 
(1) Paid pursuant to a judgment of conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
for a crime (felony or misdemeanor) in a criminal proceeding; 
(2) Paid as a civil penalty imposed by Federal, State, or local law, including additions 
to tax and additional amounts and assessable penalties imposed by chapter 68 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954; 
(3) Paid in settlement of the taxpayer's liability for a fine or penalty (civil or crimi-
nal); or 
(4) Forfeited as collateral posted in connection with a proceeding which could result 
in imposition of such a fine or penalty. 
Such amount does not include legal fees and related expenses paid or incurred in the 
defense of a prosecution or civil action arising from a violation of the law imposing 
the fme or civil penalty, nor court costs assessed against the taxpayer, or stenographic 
and printing charges. Compensatory damages (including damages under section 4A of 
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15a), as amended) paid to a government do not constitute 
a fme or penalty. 
.. Memorandum from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to Edwin S. Cohen, Assis-
tant Secretary of the Treasury 3-4 (Dec. 8, 1970), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TM 
HeinOnline -- 13 Va. Tax Rev. 281 1993-1994
1993] Section 162(1) 281 
While unambiguously stating that section 162(f) of the Code ap-
plies to civil exactions, the regulations did not clarify the manner 
in which 162(f) applies. The broad inclusion of any civil penalty in 
the definition suggested that any exaction carrying the "penalty" 
label would not be deductible. However, two particular provisions 
in the regulations imply that "penalty" might be defined function-
ally (Le., defined by its effect rather than its name). The first pro-
vision, undoubtedly prompted by Professor Taggart's examples, 
'applies the definition to "additions to tax" and "penalties" under 
the Code. Rejecting Taggart's position, the regulations provide 
that additions to tax as well as penalties would not be deductible.29 
Since additions to tax are not labeled penalties by the substantive 
law imposing them,SO the regulations must contemplate that some 
criterion other than label defines penalty. Functional analysis is 
the only likely criterion, yet the regulations never disclose the de-
terminative function of a "penalty." 
The second provision suggesting functional analysis states that 
"compensatory damages. ' .. paid to a government do not consti-
tute a fine or penalty."sl Thus, a civil exaction, denominated a 
penalty by the substantive law imposing it, nonetheless could be 
deductible. The two examples thereby suggest a functional defini-
tion for "penalty," but the regulations never reveal the determina-
tive function other than to state that compensation is not a func-
tion of a penalty. 
The Senate Finance Committee commented upon the proposed 
regulation in its report on the Revenue Act of 1971 (the "1971 Sen-
ate Report,,).s2 The Committee agreed that section 162(f) of the 
File (citation omitted) . 
•• Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 9637, 9639 (May 27, 1971). 
8. The additions to tax are provided in subchapter A of Chapter 68 of the Code; the 
operative provisions of such additions typically provide that, "in [the] case of failure 
[timely] to file any return ... there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as 
tax on such return 5 percent of the amount of such tax .... n I.R.C. § 6651(a)(I). 
81 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 9637, 9639 (May 27,1971). 
a. Senate Comm. on Finance, Revenue Act of 1971, S. Rep. No. 437, 92nd,Cong., 1st Sess. 
73-74 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1979-80, and in 1972-1 C.B. 559, 600. In 
the 1971 Act, Congress did not amend § 162(0, but did amend the public policy based 
disallowances codified in 1969. The 1971 Act's changes were to (1) delete the requirement in 
§ 162(c)(2) that a criminal conviction occur before a deduction for a bribe or kickback is 
denied, (2) extend the disallowance beyond bribes and kickbacks to any other payment ille-
gal under federal or generally enforced state law which subjects the payor to a criminal 
penalty or the loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade or business, and (3) broadly 
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Code extended to civil exactions, but it did not agree with the reg-
ulations' definition of which civil exactions are not deductible. The 
Committee used Taggart's example of "additions to tax" and pen-
alties to illustrate the point. Rejecting the Treasury's position that 
all "additions to tax" are nondeductible, the Finance Committee 
essentially agreed with Taggart's position that "additions to tax" 
are deductible. However, it distinguished certain additions to tax 
- those for which the Government bears the fraud burden of 
proof - as nondeductible. ss In addition, the Committee adopted 
functional analysis generally to distinguish deductible and nonde-
ductible civil penalties by stating that section 162(0 disallows "de-
ductions for payments of sanctions which are imposed under civil 
statutes but which in general terms serve the same purpose as a 
fine exacted under a criminal statute."S4 
The Treasury implemented the 1971 Senate Report to a minor 
deny a deduction for referral fees, kickbacks, and rebates in connection with medicare and 
medicaid. S. Rep. No. 437, at 73-74, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1979-80, and in 1972-
1 C.B. at 599. 
aa S. Rep. No. 437, supra note 32, at 73-74, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1979-80, 
and in 1972-1 C.B. at 600. Thus, the addition to tax specifically addressed by Taggart, the 
civil fraud penalty, would not be deductible because, although it was a chapter 68, sub-
chapter A "addition to tax," the Government bears the fraud burden of proof. However, for 
most chapter 68, subchapter A additions to tax, the Government does not have the burden 
of proof, and for those, whereas the Committee would permit a deduction, the regulation 
does not. See infra text accompanying notes 35-36 . 
.. S. Rep. No. 437, supra note 32, at 73-74, reprinted in ·1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1979-80, 
and in 1972-1 C.B. at 600 (emphasis added). In full, the Committee commented as follows: 
Id. 
In approving the provisions dealing with fines and similar penalties in 1969, it was 
the intention of the committee to disallow deductions for payments of sanctions 
which are imposed under civil statutes but which in general terms serve the same 
purpose as a fine exacted under a criminal statute. The provision was intended to 
apply, for example, to penalties provided for under the Internal Revenue Code in the 
form of assessable penalties (subchapter B of chapter 68) as well as to additions to 
tax under the internal revenue laws (subchapter A of chapter 68) in those cases where 
the government has the fraud burden of proof (i e., proof by clear and convincing 
evidence). It was also intended that this rule should apply to similar type payments 
under the laws of a State or other jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, it was not intended that deductions be denied in the case of 
sanctions imposed to encourage prompt compliance with requirements of law. Thus, 
many jurisdictions impose "penalties" to encourage prompt compliance with filing or 
other requirements, which are really more in the nature of late filing charges or inter-
est charges than they are fines. It was not intended that this type of sanction be 
disallowed under the 1969 action. Basically, in this area, the committee did not in-
tend to liberalize the law in the case of fines and penalties. 
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extent in December 1972. However, the Treasury ignored the re-
port's instruction to apply functional analysis to distinguish de-
ductible and nondeductible civil exactions and ignored the specific 
application of that distinction to civil tax exactions. The Treasury 
excepted from the penalty definition only "a sanction imposed to 
encourage prompt compliance with filing or other requirements if 
such sanction is really more in the nature of a late charge or inter-
est charge than afine,"315 which essentially was a quotation of part 
of the 1971 Senate Report's discussion of civil exactions. 
Commentators pointed out a clear conflict between the major 
points of the 1971 Senate Report and the Proposed Treasury Reg-
ulation.3s In 1975, the Treasury addressed the conflict. The Trea-
sury concluded that, contrary to its assertion in 1972, the 1971 
Senate Report was wholly irrelevant in construing section 162(f) of 
the Code because the 1971 Act neither enacted nor amended sec-
tion 162(f).37 The Treasury consequently affirmed its 1972 decision 
to ignore the major points of the 1971 Senate Report and reversed 
its 1972 decision to exclude interest-like penalties from the disal-
lowance because the only support for that exclusion had been the 
1971 Senate Report.3s Thus, after finalization in 1975, the regula-
tions appeared to disallow deductions for all civil penalties and of-
III Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21, 37 Fed. Reg. 25936, 25938 (Dec. 6, 1972). In addition, the 
newly proposed regulations added an example illustrating the application of § 162(0 of the 
Code to a civil penalty under the Clean Water Act. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(c) Ex. 2,37 
Fed. Reg. 25936, 25938. That example was litigated in True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197 
(10th Cir. 1990); see infra note 109 . 
.. A January 30, 1975 internal Treasury memorandum refers to a comment received from 
Arthur Andersen & Co., dated February 5, 1973, which indicated that some taxpayers con-
cluded that § 162(f) of the Code does not disallow the deduction of additions to tax im-
posed by subchapter A of chapter 68 of the Code. Memorandum from Donald C. Alexander, 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to Frederic W. Hickman, Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury 4 (Jan. 30, 1975), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TM File . 
•• Id. at 6-7. Every court to consider the issue has relied upon the "subsequent" legisla-
tive history in construing § 162(0 of the Code with the exception of one Tax Court case, 
Uhlenbrock v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 818, 822 n.5 (1977) (specifically ignoring the 1971 
Senate Report). Yet subsequent to Uhlenbrock, the Tax Court extensively relied upon the 
1971 Senate Report. See infra text accompanying note 45. 
III On February 20, 1975 the Treasury removed the language in the regulation excepting 
interest-like penalties from the penalty definition which had been included in December 
1972 in response to the 1971 Senate Report. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21 (as amended by T.D. 
7345). On July 11, 1975 the Treasury finalized the "fines and penalties" regulation, defining 
the terms identically with the original proposed regulation of May 27, 1971. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.162-21(b) (as amended by T.D. 7366). 
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fered no guidance on the definition of "penalty" other than that 
"compensatory damages paid to a government" are not penalties, 
whereas "additions to tax" imposed under the Code are penalties. 
D. Establishing That Purpose is Determinative 
Shortly after the Treasury finalized the regulations, courts inter-
preted section 162(0 of the Code. No court has given more than 
passing consideration to the issue of whether section 162(0 applies 
only to criminal fines. Two courts that did consider the narrow in-
terpretation of section 162(0 rejected it for one or more of three 
reasons: (1) the enactment's legislative history indicates an intent 
to codify the general common-law position, and pre-enactment 
cases had denied deductions for civil exactions,39 (2) the post-en-
actment legislative history (the 1971 Senate Report) states an in-
tent to disallow the deduction of exactions imposed under civil 
statutes which serve the same purpose as a fine exacted under a 
criminal statute, and (3) the conjunctive "and" in the statutory 
language "fines and similar penalties" must include something be-
sides fines. "0 
The cases construing section 162(0 of the Code therefore pro-
ceed upon the assumption that amounts paid by taxpayers in civil 
suits to a government can serve the same purpose as a fine exacted 
under a criminal statute - i.e., punishment - and therefore an 
income tax deduction is denied. Thus, the notion that a govern-
ment can punish a defendant in a civil proceeding, constitutionally 
suspect under due process principles until 1989, was accepted 
without murmur by courts deciding tax cases."1 
Still unresolved, however, was the issue of to which civil exac-
tions section 162(0's deduction disallowance applied. Professor 
at However, the Supreme Court never had denied deductions for civil exactions, and Tank 
Truck Rentals v. United States, the most prominent pre·enactment case, dealt only with 
criminal fines. 356 U.S. 30, 34·35 (1958) . 
•• Adolph Meller Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1360, 1362·63 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Tucker v. 
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 675, 679 n.4 (1978) . 
.. Kenneth Mann comments that, prior to the 1989 Supreme Court decision in United 
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), for due process purposes, "the notion that the state 
could impose punitive sanctions in civil proceedings had become increasingly questionable." 
Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil 
Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1795,1842 (1992). However, that notion was questioned neither by Con· 
gress in 1971 when construing § 162(0 of the Code nor by the Treasury in promulgating 
regulations (nor by the courts deciding the deductibility of civil exactions). 
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Taggart, the Treasury, and the Senate Finance Committee had ex-
plained their definitions of deductible and nondeductible civil ex-
actions using the terms "additions to tax" and "penalties" (defined 
in chapter 68 of the Code) as examples. Strangely, the first two 
reported cases involved "additions to tax," thereby presenting to 
the courts the precise issue framed in the example governing the 
earlier debates. 
In May v. Commissioner"2 and Uhlenbrock v. Commissioner,48 
the taxpayers filed tax returns and paid taxes late, thereby becom-
ing liable for additions to tax for which the Government did not 
have the fraud burden of proof. The 1971 Senate Report unam-
biguously determined that section 162(f) of the Code would not 
apply,"" but the Treasury regulations, as noted above, ignore the 
1971 Senate Report and provide that section 162(f) denies deduc-
tions for all additions to tax. 
In May, the Tax Court quoted the 1971 Senate Report's lan-
guage disallowing deductions for additions to tax only where the 
government has the fraud burden of proof, "II yet the Tax Court 
failed to note the manifest conflict between that quotation and the 
Treasury regulation. The Tax Court summarily concluded that 
Treasury Regulation section 1.162-21(b) governed and precluded 
the deduction .. e In Uhlenbrock, the Tax Court, citing May, 
reached the identical conclusion but addressed the conflict in a 
footnote: 
We recognize that there is a contrary suggestion [to the court's 
holding that section 162(f) of the Code disallowed deductions for 
additions to tax for which the Government did not have the fraud 
burden of proof] in a post-enactment legislative commentary on 
sec. 162(f). But, that commentary is ambiguous at best. Under such 
circumstances, we are not disposed to give it more than passing 
notice; .certainly it cannot be determinative of the issue involved 
herein.47 
•• 65 T.C. 1114 (1976) . 
•• 67 T.C. 818 (1977) . 
•• S. Rep. No. 437, supra note 32, at 73-74, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1979-80, 
and in 1972-1 C.B. at 600. 
46 65 T.C. at 1115 . 
•• Id. at 1116 . 
., Uhlenbrock, 67 T.C. at 822 n.5 (citation omitted). The Tax Court's use of that precise 
portion of the 1971 Senate Report is selective. Indeed, in another case the taxpayer cited the 
1971 Senate Report's fraud burden of proof language and argued that any civil penalty is a 
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Mter May and Uhlenbrock, the scope of "similar penalty" ap-
peared especially broad because the Tax Court, accepting the 
Treasury regulations' position without analysis, had disallowed the 
deduction of an exaction not labelled a penalty by the substantive 
law imposing it"S The only discernible basis of. the May and 
"similar penalty" only if the prosecuting government has the fraud burden of proof. Huff v. 
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 804, 822 (1983). The Tax Court disagreed, concluding that the fraud 
burden of proof language applied only for purposes of distinguishing deductible and non-
deductible additions to tax under subchapter A of chapter 68 of the Code. According to the 
court, the fraud burden of proof did not apply to distinguish deductible from nondeductible 
penalties in general. Id. at 823-24. Yet in Uhlenbrock, that same language would have re-
quired a decision in favor of the taxpayer. The Tax Court ignored it and held that an addi-
tion to tax for which the Government did not have the fraud burden of proof nonetheless 
was not deductible. Uhlenbrock, 67 T.C. at 822. Uhlenbrock and Huff render the fraud 
burden of proof language a nullity. The language distinguishes neither additions to tax nor 
civil penalties in general. 
In addition, the Tax Court has quoted the 1971 Senate Report summarily to conclude 
that chapter 68, subchapter B penalties are not deductible. Reid v. Commissioner, 42 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1741, 1747 (1981). For subchapter B penalties, there is no conflict between 
the Treasury regulations and the 1971 Senate Report, because the Report said that § 162(f) 
of the Code denies deduction of all subchapter B penalties. However, the Tax Court, like 
the Treasury when promulgating regulations, does not explain how half of a sentence in a 
congressional report reflects legislative intent (when addressing subchapter B penalties), but 
the other half does not (when addressing subchapter A additions to tax). A Service ruling 
solved the conflict simply by omitting the fraud burden of proof language from its quote of 
the 1971 Senate Report. Rev. Rul. 78-196, 1978-1 C.B. 45. Similarly, the Tax Court often 
relies upon the 1971 Senate Report to rebut the argument that the 1969 Senate Report 
shows that § 162(f) of the Code is limited to criminal rmes. Middle Atlantic Distributors, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1136, 1142-43 (1979) ("The legislative history of section 162(f) 
has been called ambiguous. Certainly, however, by 1972 it was clear that section 162(f) was 
intended to include civil penalties 'which in general terms serve the same purpose as a fine 
exacted under a criminal statute.''') (quoting S. Rep. No. 437, supra note 31, at 73, re-
printed in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1980, and in 1971 C.B. at 600). Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 652 n.l77 (1980) (recognizing the temporal problem of a 1971 
legislative report addressing a 1969 enactment, but concluding, "we believe the latter com-
mittee report [1971 Senate Report] accurately reflects the intent of Congress in enacting 
sec. 162(f)"). 
A comparison of Uhlenbrock, Huff, Reid, Middle Atlantic, and Southern Pacific suggests 
that, according to the Tax Court, the 1971 Senate Report accurately reflects enactment in-
tent with respect to chapter 68 exactions only when the Report advances the Commis-
sioner's arguments . 
• s The Code section at issue in May and Uhlenbrock, § 6651, is contained in subchapter 
A of chapter 68 of the Code. Subchapter A is headed "Additions to the tax and additional 
amounts," in contradistinction to subchapter B headed "Assessable penalties." Throughout 
§ 6651, the operative concept is an addition to the tax otherwise due resulting from late 
return filing or late payment of tax. However, the heading of § 6651(b) (which provides that 
the addition to tax is imposed only on the portion of tax not timely paid) is "penalty im-
posed on net amount due." "Penalty" nowhere appears in the text of the section, but the 
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Uhlenbrock decisions is that, because the "additions to tax" were 
not interest, they were punishment. These decisions only gave 
greater support to the view that any not-compensatory payment to 
a government is not deductible. 
The broad view of "similar penalty" continued to hold sway in 
Tucker u. Commissioner's in which the Tax Court addressed the 
general application of section 162(0 to civil penalties. The Tax 
Court did not apply functional analysis to decide whether the civil 
. exaction assessed against the taxpayer under New York's Taylor 
Law, prohibiting public employee strikes, constituted punishment. 
The Tax Court noted only that the legislative history of the Taylor 
Law and a New York court decision termed the exaction a "civil 
penalty."IIG After Tucker, it appeared that any civil exaction 
dubbed a "penalty," however remotely, by the substantive law im-
posing it would not be deductible. . 
The next year the Tax Court changed its mind without reversing 
Tucker. Contrary to its Tucker analysis, in Middle Atlantic Dis-
tributors, Inc. u. Commissioner,lIl the Tax Court did not find the 
fact that the substantive law labeled a civil action a "penalty" to 
be d~terminative. Instead, the court distinguished among civil pen-
alties stating that "it is clear that, if the deduction of a civil fine 
(or similar penalty) is to fall within the proscription of section 
162(0, the fine must be one which punishes and/or deters."1I1I The 
court apparently accepted the 1971 Senate Report's focus on a 
penalty's purpose and rejected the Treasury regulations' inclusion 
of any "civil penalty" within the disallowance. Thus, the Tax 
Court appeared to accept a functional definition of "similar pen-
alty" based upon the penalty's purpose. liS 
appearance of "penalty" in the heading apparently was sufficient for the Tax Court in May 
and Uhlenbrock, notwithstanding the subchapter A/subchapter B distinction in the 1971 
Senate Report. At best for the Tax Court, there was one heading indicating that § 6651 of . 
the Code is not a penalty and one indicating that it is. (Two other subsections of § 6651 
contain the word "penalty" in their headings: "Increase in penalty for failure to pay tax in 
certain cases," § 6651(d), and "Increase in penalty for fraudulent failure to file," § 6651(0. 
Neither subsection was at issue in Mayor Uhlenbrock). It is fair to conclude that an exac- . 
tion under § 6651 of the Code is not considered a penalty under the substantive law impos-
ing it . 
•• 69 T.C. 675 (1978). 
00 Id. at 681. 
•• 72 T.C. 1136 (1979) . 
•• Id. at 1143 . 
.. Curiously, the Tax Court has not reexamined May and Uhlenbrock in light of its turn 
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All subsequent courts, except the Federal Circuit, have agreed 
that section 162(f)'s application depends upon the purpose of the 
state-invoked civil sanction.1i4 The Federal Circuit apparently finds 
the penalty label determinative, but concedes that penalties are 
deductible if they represent interest charges for late filing or re-
present damages for injury to the government's business or prop-
erty. Ii Ii Thus, the Federal Circuit contemplates at least' a: limited 
purpose inquiry to decide if either of its two narrow exceptions 
applies. 
III. A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO DECIDING SECTION 162(f) CASES 
A. Recognizing the Hierarchy 
Courts deciding tax cases have been of many minds in deciding 
how to determine the purpose of a state-invoked civil sanction, but 
a consensus on a hierarchy of factors to use has emerged. The hier-
archy consists of three factors: (1) legislative intent, (2) the partic-
ular circumstances at hand, and (3) the nature of the remedy. 
At the top of the hierarchy of factors is the legislative intent 
with respect to the provision under which the government brings 
away from the use of an all-encompassing definition of "penalty" towards the use of a de-
tailed "purpose" inquiry. The purpose of the "additions to tax" of subchapter A of chapter 
68 is not to punish, for there is no declaration of punitive intent in the legislative history or 
the statute, and the manner of calculating the damages shows that additions to tax compen-
sate the Government for the loss of use of money. The Tenth Circuit in dicta noted the 
precarious nature of the Treasury regulations' disallowance of all chapter 68 civil tax exac-
tions, True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1204 n.18 (10th Cir. 1990), and with it the 
precarious nature of the Tax Court's decisions in May and Uhlenbrack. 
.. Authorities concluding that the purpose of a payment determines application of 
§ 162(0 include the Second Circuit, Tenth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Tax Court, and the Ser-
vice's published rulings. See Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1990); 
True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 1990); Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. 
United States, 708 F.2d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 1983); Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 75 T.C. 497, 652 (1980); Rev. Rul. 88-46, 1988-1 C.B. 76. Only the Federal Circuit 
rejected the purpose inquiry in Colt Indus., Inc. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1311, 1313-14 
(Fed. Cir. 1989), affg, 11 Cl. Ct. 140 (1986) . 
•• In Colt Industries, the Federal Circuit wrote: 
The committee's comments [in the 1971 Senate Report] were to clarify that civil pen-
alties, as well as criminal, are within the ambit of section 162(0, not an effort to 
distinguish between deductible and nondeductible civil penalties. . . . As is apparent, 
neither the statute nor the regulations prescribe a "purpose" inquiry. It is therefore 
beyond our mandate to embark on one to make our own assessment of the deductibil-
ity of a particular penalty. 
880 F.2d at 1313-14. See Colt Indus., 11 Cl. Ct. at 146. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Va. Tax Rev. 289 1993-1994
1993] Section 162(f) 289 
its claim. Courts deciding tax cases have discerned such legislative 
intent from three sources: (1) legislative history; (2) the place of 
the provision at issue in a statutory scheme; and (3) court decisions 
construing the provision at issue for purposes other than deduct-
ibility under section 162(f).68 
If a court deciding a section 162(f) case cannot discern from leg-
islative intent an intention to punish, or if it discerns both an in-
tent to punish and an intent not to punish (a "dual purpose" case), 
then the next factor in the hierarchy is an examination of facts and 
circumstances specific to the case. Examples of these are the text 
of the judicial or administrative order imposing the sanction, a 
transcript of the sentencing proceedings, or the text of a settle-
ment agreement compromising the litigation. 
If neither legislative intent nor the facts and circumstances spe-
cific to the case are determinative, then the court examines the 
nature of the remedy available to the government upon proof of 
the claim to decide whether the purpose of the exaction is puni-
tive. Here the cases often improperly conclude that if a remedy is 
not-compensatory, then it is punitive. 
Although currently this hierarchy is discernible only by observa-
tion,67 courts should recognize the hierarchy expressly, both be-
156 Obviously, a court decision construing the provision at issue for purposes of a § 162(0 
deduction would be considered by the court as persuasive authority. The sources here are, 
for instance, court decisions deciding whether procedural rules for consumer class actions 
apply to an action brought under the provision at issue . 
.. The Service's most recent published rulings analyzing application of § 162(0 of the 
Code fit within the hierarchy outlined. In Rev. Rul. 88-46, 1988-1 C.B. 76, the Service con-
cluded that a non-conformance penalty ("NCP") assessed by the Environmental Protection 
Agency ("EPA") was deductible because legislative history showed that the NCP was not-
punitive and was one of two lawful alternative methods for receiving a certificate of con-
formity. Section 206(g)(l) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7525(g)(I), required the EPA to 
issue a certificate of conformity for any class or category of heavy duty vehicles or engines 
that exceeded a set emission standard. If the manufacturer paid a NCP, the manufacturer 
could exceed the regular standard but not an upper limit associated with that standard. The 
ruling noted the following: (1) the legislative history indicated that the NCP was to be set at 
a level that would eliminate the competitive advantage, if any, for the manufacturer of a 
nonconforming vehicle or engine, (2) the legislative history referred to the NCP as a per-
formance penalty, irrespective of fault, and (3) the purpose of the Act, according to the 
legislative history, was to assure the achievement of the maximum emission reduction that 
reasonably could be technologically available, while at the same time not removing the non-
conforming manufacturer from the market. 
More recently, the Service concluded in Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-46 I.R.B. 32, that a $2000 
per ton penalty imposed by section 411 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2584 (1990), "is punitive as indicated by the legislative history ac-
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cause it conforms to substantial parts of the analyses applied in 
the pertinent cases and because it comports with the legislative 
history of section 162(f). 
The legislative history of section 162(f) (the 1969 Senate Report) 
. states an intent to codify and occupy the judicially-created public 
policy disallowance of deductions. liS In Commissioner v. Tellier,1I9 
the most recent Supreme Court decision at the time section 162(f) 
was enacted, the Court stated that there are two elements needed 
to establish a public policy disallowance. They are governmental 
declaration of a policy and the immediate frustration of that policy 
if a tax deduction occurs.60 Section 162(f) and its legislative history 
establish that frustration of governmental policy occurs when an 
exaction intended as punishment is tax deductible.61 The 1971 
Senate Report reiterates that the presence or absence of punitive 
purpose governs the deductibility of an exaction.62 Consequently, 
companying the Act." Id. at 33 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 490 (Part 2), 10Ist Cong., 2d Sess. 5 
(1990». 
However, in Revenue Ruling 78-196, 1978-1 C.B. 45, the Service concluded that a liquidity 
deficiency penalty imposed under regulatioris of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board upon 
a savings and loan institution that failed to maintain the prescribed level of liquid assets 
was a non deductible penalty. The ruling examined the manner of calculating the penalty, 
which was to take the amount of the deficiency and multiply it by the annual rate of inter-
est plus 2% that would be charged to borrow such amount. The ruling concluded that the 
interest-like calculation did not remove the penalty from § 162(0, analogizing the liquidity 
deficiency penalty to additions to tax under chapter 68, subchapter A, of the Code. As noted 
earlier, the legislative history of § 162(0 indicates that additions to tax under subchapter A 
of chapter 68 are not deductible only where the government has the fraud burden of proof. 
The ruling makes a material omission by quoting the legislative history and redacting the 
fraud burden of proof language. 
08 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text . 
•• 383 U.S. 687 (1966). 
eo Id. at 694. 
81 Criminal fines are a boundary case of the general rule. While a penalty is a "similar 
penalty" only if it is intended to punish, the defmition of "fme" does not expressly contain 
a purpose element. The Treasury regulations contemplate that "fme" includes all exactions 
paid pursuant to conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for a crime so intent to 
punish is not relevant to deciding the deductibility of criminal fines. But, whether "fine or 
similar penalty" means those exactions intended to punish or means criminal fines plus 
those exactions intended to punish makes little practical difference. The set of criminal 
fines not intended to punish probably is null because the invocation of criminal proceedings 
itself constitutes an intent to punish . 
•• See supra note 32 and accompanying text. It may be argued that the 1971 Senate Re-
port is not relevant in construing § 162(0 because it does not relate to enactment or amend-
ment of the statute. However, the issue is really immaterial because the 1971 Report only 
expressly states a point that the 1969 Report stated via incorporation by reference: intent to 
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the determinative issue in applying section 162(f) is, as virtually all 
courts have concluded, finding a governmental declaration that the 
exaction at issue is intended to punish. 
Few cases have involved express declarations of punitive intent 
found in statutes, legislative history, or the facts specific to the 
case. That absence is not surprising because, prior to 1989, punish-
. ment by a government within a civil suit was constitutionally sus-
pect. As late as 1980, in United States v. Ward,8s the Supreme 
Court determined that a penalty punitive either in purpose or ef-
fect could not constitutionally be exacted in a civil setting.8• It is 
understandable that legislatures and government officials prose-
cuting civil suits did not declare an intent to punish, for such dec-
larations ran the risk of rendering their acts unconstitutional. 
However, in United States v. Halper,86 the Court, without revers-
ing Ward, held that a civil sanction properly may punish.88 The 
Supreme Court reiterated its changed stance last Term in Austin 
v. United States.87 The Court concluded that, although civil pro-
ceedings properly may punish, civil punishment (just like criminal 
punishment) may not be excessive;88 thus, the Court held that 
"punishment" should be treated identically whether imposed by 
criminal or civil law. 
While governments now may expressly punish via civil law, a 
collateral consequence of a declared intent to punish might con-
tinue to suppress such express declarations. Recent scholarship has 
punish defines the scope of the disallowance . 
•• 448 U.S. 242 (1980) . 
... Id. at 248-49 . 
•• 490 U.S. 435 (1989) . 
.. In Halper the Court never addressed the manifest conflict with Ward. It noted: "It is 
commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, 
and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties." 
However, the Court supported its position by citing only those civil cases in which punitive 
damages were permitted in suits between private persons. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447. See 
Mann, supra note 41, at 1842 . 
• 7 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) . 
.. The Supreme Court never has held any criminal or civil fine unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
26, Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), reprinted in 
185 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitu-
tional Law 424 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. 1990). In Browning-Ferris Indus., 
the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to 
punitive damages recovered in suits between private parties. 
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considered whether more than ordinary civil process is due defend-
ants punished by civil law. In a recent symposium addressing puni-
tive civil sanctions,ae experts agreed that a civil defendant pun-
ished by a government should be afforded some form of criminal 
process and disagreed only on what constitutes punishment.7o 
However, except for a few late nineteenth century cases and a 
handful of opinions dealing with in rem forfeitures, the Supreme 
Court has consistently rejected the argument that a civil defendant 
is entitled to criminal process.71 Yet Austin and Halper may signal 
a change. Last Term in Austin, the Court decided that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits state-invoked civil sanctions from punishing 
excessively.72 In Halper, the Court decided that the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits combinations of criminal and civil punishment 
which result in the imposition of multiple penalties.73 At least in 
the modern cases, the issue of whether the criminal processes de-
scribed in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments apply to per-
sons punished by state-invoked civil sanctions is still to be de-
cided.74 While a legislature declaring that an exaction is punitive 
no longer fears that it is unconstitutional to litigate the exaction in 
a civil proceeding, it may run the risk that the civil proceeding will 
have to include at least some criniinal process. The risk that courts 
will be required to provide criminal process at an increased cost is 
a possibility that may continue to suppress express declarations of 
punitive intent. Therefore, future courts may continue to utilize 
factor three of the hierarchy - inference of punitive intent from 
the nature of the remedy - to decide the majority of the section 
162(f) cases.711 
8. Symposium, Punishment, 101 Yale L.J. 1681 (1992). 
7. Mann, supra note 41, at 1862, 1870-71; John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blur-
ring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be· Done About It, 101 Yale 
L.J. 1875, 1876-77, 1885 (1992); Abraham S. Goldstein, White-Collar Crime and Civil Sanc-
tions, 101 Yale L.J. 1895, 1899 (1992); Franklin E. Zimring, The Multiple Middlegrounds 
Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1901, 1907-08 (1992). 
71 Mann, supra note 41, at 1813-44. 
7' 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). 
7. 490 U.S. at 448-49. 
7' Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804, n.4. See, e.g., United States v. $30,440 in U.S. Currency, 
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20976 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1993) (an ineffective assistance of counsel 
case, considering Austin and whether the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel "in all crimi-
nal prosecutions" applies to civil forfeitures, but obviating the issue by deciding that coun-
sel was effective). 
7. If a legislature wants to apply economic coercion in a civil case without the require-
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B. Refining the Hierarchy 
The hierarchy of factors used to examine those places in which a 
governmental declaration of punitive purpose will· be found, if one 
exists, accurately indicates which factor would prevail in case of a 
conflict. However, the manner by which courts and administrative 
agencies have applied the factors requires substantial refinement. 
First, courts and administrative agencies have accepted attenuated 
declarations of punitive purpose. Second, the Tax Court and the 
Service have arrogated power to "substance over form" analysis in 
derogation of the purpose of section 162(f).?6 Both have suggested 
that they would disregard declarations of not-punitive intent in 
legislative history or in the facts and circumstances of certain 
cases. Third, in applying nature-of-the-remedy analysis, many 
courts and the Service improperly have required the taxpayer to 
prove that the exaction was compensatory rather than that it was 
merely not-punitive, thereby misapprehending when the manner of 
computing damages shows that a remedy punishes the payor. 
1. Legislative Intent 
Seven cases have been decided on the basis of legislative intent. 
A brief look at the cases is illuminating. In Tucker v. Commis-
sioner,?? the Tax Court decided that the "penalty" label employed 
in New York legislative history and New York court decisions 
demonstrated that the purpose of a penalty was to punish striking 
teachers. The Tax Court in Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Com-
missioner?8 held that the purpose of the Safety Appliance Act was 
to protect employees from injury, basing its finding on other cases 
ment of providing criminal process, and the legislature believes that the necessary deterrent 
effect exceeds compensatory damages, it should act as follows: For due process purposes, as 
long as the legislature prices the exaction at or below "an the Government's costs" and does 
not declare a punitive intent, proceedings involving the exaction should be viewed as normal 
civil suits. Such an exaction, not being punishment, is deductible (or rather should be de-
ductible upon proper application of § 162(f) of the Code). But, certainty on deductibility is 
a good result because now the legislature knows to price the exaction on an after-tax basis. 
TO In Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the Court established the "substance over 
form" doctrine stating that "the question for determination is whether what was done, apart 
from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended." Id. at 469. Sometimes the 
doctrine is elevated to status of a substantive rule of tax law even though it is simply is a 
rule of statutory interpretation . 
.. 69 T.C. 675 (1978) 
.. 75 T.C. 497 (1980) 
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which had decided whether the Act applied to specific personal in-
juries.79 The court also ruled that the purpose of the Twenty-Eight 
Hour Act was to prevent cruelty to animals in transit.80 In Huff v. 
Commissioner,81 the Tax Court determined that a California Su-
preme Court decision, involving an issue of civil procedure, showed 
that the purpose of a civil penalty exacted under the California 
Business and Professions Code was to punish. In Waldman v. 
Commissioner,82 the Tax Court decided that restitution paid to 
victims of crime was not deductible because a criminal conviction 
is a condition precedent to the imposition of restitution.83 
Two additional Tax Court cases summarily concluded that pay-
ments of parking tickets were not deductible. Jackson v. Commis-
sioner reached this conclusion without offering a principled reason 
in the holding.84 In O'Connor v. Commissioner,8" the Tax Court 
was more forthcoming. There, the court stated: "It is clear that the 
governmental statutes or ordinances violated by petitioners were 
intended to ensure the orderly operation of motor vehicles on the 
highways."88 The court did not indicate which statutes or ordi-
nances were violated or from where their intent was discerned.87 
The Claims Court in Colt Indus., Inc. v. United States decided 
that congressional legislative history showed that the purpose of 
the federal Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act penalties at issue 
was to punish.88 
•• Id. at 647. 
80 Id. at 644, 647. The Tax Court discerned its holding from the Act's title, "Twenty-
Eight Hour Act [Care of Animals in Transit)," (brackets in origin81). Id. The cOurt also 
based its decision on a Supreme Court case which determined the number of penalties for 
which a carrier was liable for violating rules governing the shipment of live animals via rail. 
The Tax Court implicitly equated those purposes with punishment. 
8' 80 T.C. 804 (1983). 
so 88 T.C. 1384 (1987), afrd by order, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit 
adopted the Tax Court's holding and reasoning by order. 
sa In the alternative, the Tax Court applied its civil penalty analysis concluding that two 
California Supreme Court cases indicated that, where a California sentencing court imposes 
the obligation to pay restitution, the payment is " 'imposed for purpoSes of enforcing the 
law' and hence is nondeductible under Section 162(f)." Id. at 1388 . 
... 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1315, 1319 n.3. (1975). 
86 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 499 (1986). 
88 Id. at 507. 
87 Perhaps the Tax Court believes that it can take judicial notice that all parking tickets 
are intended to punish. 
88 11 Cl. Ct. 140 (1986), afrd on other grounds, 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The 
Claims Court applied a balancing test to the language within the legislative history to the 
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None of the seven cases should have been decided on the basis 
of legislative intent.89 The sources of legislative intent relied upon 
by each court did not declare that the penalty at issue was in-
tended to punish. Some decisions attached talismanic significance 
to the presence of the word "penalty" in legislative history or in 
court decisions construing the provision at issue without further 
inquiry into whether there was a punitive intent behind the pen-
alty. Others took a gestalt approach to the legislative history and 
found an expression of punitive intent even though such intent 
could not be derived from a summation of a statute's parts.90 
The Supreme Court in Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner91 
cautioned against ranging too far afield in locating declarations of 
punitive intent. Prior to the enactment of section 162(0, the . Court 
denied deduction of criminal fines under that statute's predeces-
sor, the public policy disallowance. The Court noted, "[b]ecause 
state policy in this case was evidenced by specific legislation, it is 
unnecessary to decide whether the requisite 'governmental declara-
tion' might exist other than in an Act of the Legislature."92 Section 
162(0 cases properly have expanded the search for punitive intent 
Clean Air Act penalties stating, "[tJhe facts regarding the punitive nature of the civil pen-
alty provisions outweigh the references in the report to a 'remedial' or 'deterrent' purpose." 
Id. at 144. In reference to the Clean Water Act penalties, the court held that "[tJhe legisla-
tive history of the Clean Water Act does not provide significant insight into the question 
regarding the punitive nature of section 309(d) of the Act." Id. However, the court then 
concluded that, because legislative history referred to the Clean Air Act civil penalty provi-
sions, the punitive objective of those provisions was incorporated by reference. Id. at 144-45. 
a. Note, however, that only two reached an improper result. 
10 In perhaps the most egregious case, the Tax Court in Southern Pacific decided that the 
words "Care of Animals in Transit" in the popular name of a statute declared a punitive 
purpose to penalties exacted under the statute. Yet these words do not appear in the stat-
ute's actual title. As printed in the Statutes at Large, the act had no official name; the title 
of the act reads: 
An Act To prevent cruelty to animals while in transit by railroad or other means of 
transportation from one State or Territory or the District of Columbia into or 
through another State or Territory or the District of Columbia, and repealing sections 
forty-three hundred and eighty-six, forty-three hundred and eighty-seven, forty-three 
hundred and eighty-eight, forty-three hundred and eighty-nine, and forty-three hun-
dred and ninety of the United States Revised Statutes. 
Pub. L. No. 59-340, 34 Stat. S07 (1906) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 71-74 (1988». 
A note following 45 U.S.C. § 71 indicates that the chapter that includes sections 71 to 74 
popularly is known as the "Live Stock Transportation Act," and also known as the "Cruelty 
to Animals Act," "Twenty-Eight Hour Law," and "Food and Rest Law." 
.. 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
.. Id. at 34 n.S. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Va. Tax Rev. 296 1993-1994
296 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 13:271 
to legislative history and to statements by officials prosecuting 
civil cases. However, the Court's caution should be observed. 
Rather than relying on an attenuated inference based upon statu-
tory titles or interpretations having little to do with a statute's pu-
nitive intent, courts should search for a direct declaration of puni-
tive purpose. 
While the asserted legislative intent did not support denial of 
deductions in five of seven cases, examination of the nature of the 
remedy supports the decisions. In none of those cases was the mea-
sure of the remedy loss to either the government or the victim. 
Two legislative intent cases93 were decided wrongly both because 
the asserted declarations of legislative intent were inadequate and 
because the measure of the remedy was loss to either the govern-
ment or the victim of the illegality. The nondeductible double-
damages remedy recovered by New York in Tucker is indistin-
guishable from the deductible double-damages remedy recovered 
by the United States in Middle Atlantic Distributors.94 In Wald-
man, the amount of restitution was measured by loss to the vic-
tims; thus, it should have been deductible.911 
When the enacting legislature directly declares that a penalty is 
punishment or otherwise declares that the penalty is not deducti-
ble, that declaration should govern without resort to any other 
analysis. Placing legislative intent at the top of the hierarchy en-
sures that result and provides an incentive to enacting legislatures 
to state their intention with respect to deductibility of civil sanc-
tions. Deductibility of civil sanctions always should be considered 
by the enacting legislature. Economic deterrence correctly requires 
that the deductibility issue be addressed.96 A legislature need only 
state what should already be on its mind. 
Where legislative intent rises to the level of a declaration of pu-
nitive or not-punitive intent, that intent should conclusively decide 
the section 162(f) ,issue. While the legislative history of section 
162(f) demands this rule, the Tax Court has indicated that it 
might conclude otherwise. In Southern Pacific, the court wrote: 
•• Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384 (1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Tucker v. Commissioner 69 T.C. 675 (1978). 
... Tucker and Middle Atlantic Distributors are analyzed on this point in Part II. 
' •• Waldman is analyzed on this point in Part III. 
.. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523 (1984). 
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Petitioner's proposed distinction based on the type of conduct con-
stituting the violation may not prove to be determinative in any 
particular case and would permit the characterization given to a 
particular statute by the enacting body to be determinative of the 
deductibility of an expense under Federal tax law. For example, if 
one locality characterized parking violations as misdemeanors 
while another characterized them as civil violations, a taxpayer in 
the first locality would be precluded from deducting the fine by 
sec. 162(f) while a taxpayer in the second locality would be permit-
ted to deduct the penalty under sec. 162(a) since this type of con-
duct clearly cannot be categorized as inherently evil or reprehensi-
ble. Yet, it is exactly the same conduct engaged in by the taxpayer 
in the first locality.97 
The Tax Court in Southern Pacific actually would use "sub-
stance over form" analysis in derogation of the purpose of the stat-
ute, not in furtherance of it. The statutory intent is clear. The pur-
pose of section 162(0 of the Code is to deny a deduction when 
allowance of the deduction would "frustrate state policy in severe' 
and direct fashion by reducing the 'sting' of the penalty prescribed 
by the state legislature."s8 However, when a state declares in a 
statute or in legislative history that the purpose of a civil exaction 
is not to punish the defendant, then there is no "sting" reduced by 
the deduction. Section 162(0 represents federal deference to 
states. The federal government did not wish to offend states by 
diminishing the sting of state-mandated sanctions. Therefore, it 
crafted a judicial rule, then enacted a statute in order to avoid re-
ducing the sting of state punishments. In so doing, the federal gov-
ernment sacrificed the guiding principle of its net income 
tax-neutral economic principles-in order to accommodate state 
interests. 
The federal government would stand section 162(f) on its head if 
it simply looked beyond a state's assertion of lack of punitive in-
tent and concluded that, because a given conduct is punished in 
sister states, it must be punished in the forum state. One state may 
wish to set weight limits and levy criminal fines on overweight 
trucks while another may choose a deterrence scheme consisting of 
tolls or taxes based on vehicle weight. State A may criminalize 
.. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 653 n.179 (1980) (emphasis 
added) . 
.. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 36 (1958). 
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parking violations while state B may allow fines for such violations 
to be deductible. The differences in state approaches constitute 
federalism, not tax avoidance. It appears that the Tax Court is 
concerned with lack of uniformity. One wonders if the court envi-
sions the Commerce Clause imposing uniformity on the punitive or 
not-punitive nature of civil monetary exactions. 
The Tax Court rule would deny deduction not only of "stings," 
but of penalties that states other than the enacting state consider 
"stings." However, the legislature's declared intent should guide 
the inquiry. Even if an exaction declared non-punitive functions 
identically with a punitive exaction, asserted intent, rather than 
the intent of functionally equivalent exactions in other jurisdic-
tions, should govern section 162(f). Function, derived from the 
manner of calculating damages, is relevant only if no declaration of 
punitive intent exists. 
2. Facts and Circumstances Specific to the Case 
If neither legislative history nor court decisions construing the 
statutory provision provide evidence that the penalty is intended 
to punish, a court should consider the next factor, the facts and 
circumstances of the case, to indicate the presence or absence of a 
punitive purpose.99 
A number of cases illustrate how courts construe facts and cir-
cumstances to discern an intent to punish. In S & B Restaurant, 
Inc. v. Commissioner,I°o the Tax Court first examined the legisla-
tive intent implicit in the overall statutory structure of the Penn-
sylvania Clean Streams Law and found that the law had punitive 
and non-punitive aspects because it imposed criminal and civil 
penalties and at least one non-punitive aspect, the orderly develop-
ment of consolidated treatment facilities. "Thus," the court noted, 
"the Clean Streams Law has a dual purpose and our task is to de-
termine which purpose the payments in question were designed to 
serve."lOl The Tax Court then concluded that, in S & B's case, the 
payments were in furtherance of a non-punitive purpose and hence 
.. Due to constitutional concerns, many statutes enacted prior to United States v. Halper, 
490 U.S. 435 (1989), purposely avoided any references to intent regarding their punitive 
nature. 
100 73 T.e. 1226 (1980). 
101 Id. at 1232. 
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deductible. lOll In Bailey v. Commissionerlo8 the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that section 162(f) of the Code precluded deduction of a 
civil sanction paid pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 45(1), discerning the 
purpose of the exaction from the district court order imposing it. lo", 
The Tax Court in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner denied a 
business expense deduction for an $8,000,000 payment to a chari-
table trust based upon its review of the taxpayer's sentencing pro-
ceedings,loli In Stephens v. Commissioner, the Second Circuit iden-
tified two facts and circumstances and emphasized that they 
combined to support its conclusion that Stephens' payment of res-
titution to the victim of his crime was neither a fine nor a "similar 
penalty," nor paid to a government. IOe Thus, in S & B Restaurant, 
••• The court rested its conclusion on four grounds: (1) In contradistinction to a fine or 
penalty which usually is a fixed amount, S & B was obligated to connect into the municipal 
sewer system when it became available (at which time the payments to the Clear Water 
Fund would stop); (2) the payment was intended to approximate the charge S & B would 
have had to pay if the municipal facility had been available; (3) Pennsylvania would have 
blocked any attempt by S & B to build its own sewage treatment facilities; and (4) Penn-
sylvania, perhaps enoneously, believed that no practical environmental harm would be 
caused by S & B's continued discharges. The court found the state's agreement not to pros-
ecute "merely incidental to the main purpose of the agreement." Id. at 1233 . 
••• 756 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1985), affg an unreported Tax Court order . 
... The district court had found that Bailey "failed or neglected to obey terms of an [Fed-
eral Trade Commission] Consent Order" and ordered that Bailey "shall forfeit and pay to 
the plaintiff United States of America civil penalties in the amount of [$1,036,000]." Id. at 
46. The district court had permitted Bailey, upon his request, to apply the penalty toward 
the settlement of his potential liability in a class action pending in another federal court, 
but provided that, "the ultimate disposition of these funds in no way shall alter their status 
as civil penalties." Id. at 46. The Sixth Circuit concluded that "Bailey, therefore, forfeited 
the $1,036,000 as punishment for his violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and 
the payment was thus a fine 'imposed for purposes of enforcing the law and as punishment 
for·a violation thereof.''' Id. at 47 (quoting Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 
T.C. 497, 652 (1980» . 
••• 63 T.C.M. 2672 (1992). Allied-Signal was fined $13,240,000, the maximum fine for the 
940 counts to which it pleaded nolo contendere. Counsel for Allied-Signal and the sentenc-
ing court then reached an understanding by which Allied-Signal would establish and fund a 
charitable trust to help the environment (in exchange for which the sentencing judge would 
reduce the amount of the fine). The Tax Court concluded that, where the sentencing judge's 
statements indicated "that there may be a dual purpose for the payment, we must deter-
mine which purpose the payments in question were designed to serve." Id. at 2682. The Tax 
Court examined the record of the sentencing proceedings, quoted portions of it, and stated, 
"On these facts, we conclude that if there were a compensatory or remedial purpose for the 
payment, it was minimal." Id . 
... 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C. 108 (1989). The court examined the tran-
script of the sentencing, found that the restitution was ordered after sentencing Stephens to 
five years in prison and a frne on each count, and concluded that the judge added the resti-
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Bailey, and Allied-Signal, the courts found a governmental decla-
ration of punitive intent entirely on the facts and circumstances of 
the case: the contents of the settlement agreement in S & B Res-
taurant, the order imposing the exaction in Bailey, and a' tran-
script of the sentencing proceedings in Allied-Signal. 
Facts and circumstances should be accorded less weight' than 
legislative intent and more weight than the nature of the remedy. 
An 'explicit statement in a settlement agreement or order imposing 
a civil penalty reciting that the exaction punishes the defendant 
obviously constitutes a governmental declaration and should con-
trol despite the nature of the remedy. 
A more difficult issue arises in settlements involving multiple 
claims where, under the facts of the case, punitive intent may exist 
with respect to certain claims but not with respect to others. While 
no court construing section 162(0 of the Code yet has addressed 
this point, in such cases, facts and circumstances are relevant for 
another purpose: allocating the total consideration paid among the 
claims settled. When describing the mechanics of allocating consid-
eration among claims in a multi-claim settlement between a tax-
payer and the United States, the Service's National Office declared 
that the upper limit on the allocation to a criminal charge is the 
maximum fine for the charge.107 However, the National Office 
stated that in some circumstances, an allocation must be made to 
criminal charges that are dropped as part of the parties' agree-
ment. To illustrate, in a Technical Advice Memorandum, the tax-
payer was indicted on multiple counts, eventually pleaded guilty to 
fewer than all of the counts, paid the maximum fine for the admit-
ted violations, and agreed to make a payment to a research trust 
fund. The National Office decided that some portion of the trust 
fund payment, limited by the counts' maximum fines, might have 
to be allocated to those criminal charges that were dropped. These 
allocable portions would not be deductible. The actual allocation 
would depend upon whether field agents learned the details of the 
claims within the contemplation of the parties. 
When parties settle any litigation involving more than one claim, 
they may by agreement allocate the settlement payment amon~ 
tution and an accompanying additional suspended five-year prison term primarily to reim-
burse the victim. 
107 Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-02-002 (Sept. 30, 1985). 
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the claims settled. The Service retains the authority to challenge 
the allocation if it thinks the allocation is contrary to the facts and 
circumstances of the case.108 However, the Service's actual author-
ity to reallocate is subject to significant limitation. 
In Madson v. Commissioner/oe the parties to a suit allocated no 
consideration to a particular claim under which the plaintiff ob-
tained judgment,110 and the Service lost its attack on that alloca-
tion. If a decision not to allocate consideration to claims in judg-
ments cannot be challenged, even when that allocation serves the 
tax interest of a party, the Service appears especially misdirected 
in attacking failures to allocate consideration to dropped claims.lll 
108 If the parties do not make an allocation, then the Commissioner's right to force an 
allocation is clear. See Eisler v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 634 (1973) (court allocated a settle-
ment payment between deductible and capital expenditures where parties had made no allo-
cation but it was clear that claims of both types had been settled), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 1. If the 
amounts are paid pursuant to a judgment, then the basis on which the trier of fact grounded 
the award determines allocation among the claims. Madson v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1351, 1354 n.10 (1988). However, even with judgment allocations, the Service claims 
authority to disregard the allocation. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-37-084 (June 13, 1984) ("A written 
finding of a judge supervising the settlement of a lawsuit is a relevant factor, but not a 
conclusive factor that the Service uses in characterizing the nature of settlement amounts 
for federal income tax purposes."). 
'.0 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1351 (1988). 
110 In Madson, the taxpayer successfully prosecuted a state court suit alleging both a con-
tract claim for improper discharge and a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial 
of equal protection of the laws. The state court found for Madson on both claims and stated 
that the measure of damages was the same under either claim. While the case was on ap-
peal, Madson and the tort defendant settled. The parties allocated all consideration paid 
under the settlement to the civil rights claim possibly because such allocation served the 
individual interest of both parties. The tort defendant had insurance against the civil rights 
claim and, for Madson, damages received on account of the civil rights claim would excluda-
ble from gross income under § 104(a)(2) of the Code (while damages received on account of 
the contract claim would be taxable). See also Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 250 
(1986) (holding that all damages paid on account of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are excludable 
from gross income even when lost earnings form part of the award, in contrast to recoveries 
under employment discrimination statutes which are not entirely excludable), aff'd, 835 
F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987). The Tax Court gave effect to the allocation and found that the entire 
amount of the settlement payment was not taxable income to Madson. 
111 By the force of greater logic, a general release of all claims cannot be a reason to force 
allocation of consideration to claims not made but potentially available to the plaintiff. See 
Inaja Land Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 727, 734 (1947). Here the court stated: 
We think the respondent [Commissioner] places too much emphasis upon the release 
provision of the indenture. It is usual and customary in agreements of this character 
to incorporate a provision for the release and discharge of any possible past, present, 
or future claims and demands. The mutuality of the releases indicates the purpose 
was precautionary and protective rather than descriptive and in recognition of as-
serted claims and demands. 
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Further, the reasons for the Service not attacking settlement allo-
cations in section 162(f) cases are even stronger than in usual 
cases. 
The purpose of section 162(f) of the Code is to deny a deduction 
when allowance of the deduction would "frustrate state policy in 
severe and direct fashion by reducing the 'sting' of the penalty pre-
scribed by the state legislature. "112 When a settling government 
has disavowed an intent to punish with respect to an entire settle-
ment or has functionally done the same in an integrated settle-
ment by allocating consideration to not-punitive claims, there is no 
"sting" to be reduced. Application of a "substance over form~' 
analysis is nonsensical because it causes the federal government's 
taxing authorities to conclude that a state or agency of the federal 
government should have punished when the state or' agency had 
indicated that it was not doing SO.118 Whether a government actu-
ally punished when it indicated that it did not, or a government 
did not punish but should have, is of no moment to the. section 
162(f) analysis. Section 162(f) merely denies deductions for de-
clared punishments. Thus, contrary to the conclusion of Technical 
Advice Memorandum 86-02-002, if the taxpayer and the asserting 
government make an allocation of consideration and identify the 
punitive and not-punitive nature of the claims, the Service should 
not be permitted to challenge any aspect of the allocation. 
Id. 
111 Tank 'Truck Rentals Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 36 (1958). 
"8 No doubt well advised defendants may negotiate for a recital of no punitive intent or 
for an allocation of most or all consideration to not-punitive claims. State governments 
could begin negotiations by asserting punitive claims and then settle on the basis of not-
punitive claims with the state and defendant splitting the "tax benefit" of settling. To illus-
trate, if the state's initial demand was ,$100 in satisfaction of punitive civil claims, and the 
parties settle for $125 in satisfaction of not-punitive claims, both the state and the defend-
ant financially are better off than had the original demand been met. The state receives 
$125 versus $100, while the defendant pays $81.25 after taxes versus $100. (The calculation 
assumes a tax rate of 35% for the defendant and ignores the loss in income tax revenue 
sustained by the state if it has an income tax that parrots the deductions of the federal 
income tax). 
The normally wary eye cast by the federal tax collectors upon parties dividing potential 
federal revenues is misplaced in § 162(0 cases. The federal interest is not to reduce "st-
ings." If a state represents that an exaction is not a "sting," then § 162(0 of the Code does 
not apply. Instead, the normal federal rule of a net income tax applies. Obviously, other 
factors will influence a state's decision to disavow punishment. Sometimes, perhaps often, 
the state will choose punitive claims in order to apply the stigma associated with 
punishment. 
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3. Nature of the Remedy 
Because of frequent inconclusiveness of the two higher order fac-
tors, the lowest order factor - inference of punitive intent from 
the manner by which damages are calculated - should decide 
most tax cases concerning section 162(f) of the Code. In the future 
. that may change, depending upon the due process consequences of 
punishing by civil law. For many existing exactions, however, the 
nature of the remedy will govern. 
There are four cases in which the courts have denied deductions 
based upon the nature of the remedy.lu The T~ Court in Middle 
Atlantic Distributors, Inc. v. CommissionerlU decided that a stat-
ute had a dual purpose and that the facts and circumstances did 
not indicate a punitive intent. The court ultimately concluded, 
based upon the measure of damages, that the "penalty against 
goods" was not-punitive.1l6 In Henson Robinson Co. v. Commis-
sionerll'1 the Tax Court concluded that the amount of a penalty 
was not based upon damage to the government. The court held 
that a penalty paid to an Illinois county under Section 60-7(4) of 
the Illinois Antitrust Act was nondeductible because the purpose 
of that section could not have been to compensate the govern-
ment. llS A better justification for the Tax Court's decision would 
be that, because the measure of recovery under the penalty section 
""However, all of the legislative intent cases actually should have been decided by na-
ture-of-the-remedy analysis. 
1lO 72 T.C. 1136 (1979) 
"8 Id. at 1141. As evidenced by the settlement agreement between the United States and 
. the taxpayer, the payment was only "reimbursement for lost revenue and other damages," 
(id. at 1145) since the Customs Service had a "policy of reducing the . . . 'penalty' clainl, 
which is perforce originally for the goods or their full value, to an amount equal to 1 times 
the revenue loss ... where there is no culpable intent." Id. at 1144 (citing 19 C.F.R. 
§ 171.1(a)(l)(iv) (1975». 
117 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1984). Note that the court based its decision on a likely errone-
ous reading of Illinois law. 
"8 The court based its decision on the fact that a different section of the Illinois Anti-
trust Act provided compensation in the form of treble damages. Id. at 509-10 (citing People 
ex rel Fahner v. Climatemp, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 1096 (1981». A close reading of Climatemp, 
however, shows that the decision undermines the Tax Court's reasoning rather than sup-
ports it. The Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that Illinois could maintain actions either 
for a "penalty" under § 60-7(4) or for treble damages under § 60-7(2), but not both. Cli-
matemp, 428 N.E.2d at 1098. The Tax Court's reasoning in Henson Robinson-that the 
penalty under § 60-7(4) could not be compensatory damages because § 60-7(2) is the com-
pensatory damages section of the Illinois Antitrust Act-depends upon the simultaneous 
application of the two sections, a possibility which Climatemp prohibits. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Va. Tax Rev. 304 1993-1994
304 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 13:271 
is not loss to the government, recoveries under it are punitive, in 
contradistinction to a recovery under the treble damages section 
which is measured with respect to loss to the government. 119 
In Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. United States l20 the Sixth 
Circuit decided that the purpose of a "liquidated damages" exac-
tion imposed in addition to a fine for operating an overweight 
truck must not be punishment because only the fine was punish-
ment. In True v. United States l21 the Tenth Circuit and the dis-
trict court sharply divided on whether the remedial scheme of the 
Clean Water Act demonstrated that a penalty paid under it was 
deductible.122 
In nature-of-the-remedy analysis, the threshold question is 
whether the amount of the remedy exceeds the loss resulting from 
the acts giving rise to the remedy.12s If the exaction exceeds that. 
loss, then the exaction punishes, but only to the extent of the ex-
cess. Exactions in excess of loss punish because the capacity of a 
government to require a person to pay an amount of money not 
related to the loss caused by that person defines punishment. Pun-
no Under that view, an action by the State of Illinois under § 60-7(4) is punitive and 
leaves open the application of § 162(f) of the Code to treble damage recoveries by Illinois 
under the Illinois Antitrust Act. 
Note that after the liability at issue arose in Henson Robinson (1975), but before the Tax 
Court decision (July 12, 1984), Illinois had amended § 60-7(4), by adding to the end of 
subsection (4) that "[n]othing in this subsection shall impair the right of any person to 
bring an action under subsection (2) of this Section," thereby apparently reversing the Cli-
matemp holding. 1983 Ill. Laws 236 § 1 (effective Jan. 1, 1984). That amendment was not in 
effect when Henson Robinson's liability arose, nor was it included in the text of the Tax 
Court's opinion quoting § 60-7(4). Henson Robinson, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 508 n.2. 
uo 708 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'g 48 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 11 5032 (E.D. Tenn. 1981). 
u, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'g 603 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Wyo. 1985). 
u. The District Court concluded that the purpose of the Clean Water Act penalty at issue 
was "remedial and compensatory," both because the penalty was imposed regardless of fault 
and because the proceeds were used for costs of administration and cleanup. 
The Tenth Circuit decided that neither the strict liability standard nor the use of the 
proceeds to fmance cleanup costs made the penalty "primarily compensatory." The court 
found that the legislative history of § 162(f) demonstrated an intent to include strict liabil-
ity penalties because that legislative history stated an intent to codify the general court 
position and because a prior decision of the Supreme Court had applied the public policy 
disallowance to penalties for violations of strict liability statutes. On the use-of-proceeds 
point, the Tenth Circuit noted that, while the use of the proceeds for financing cleanup 
costs indicated that one purpose of the penalty was "compensatory and remedial," it was 
not the principal purpose, concluding, "[t]he civil penalty in section 311(b)(6) strikes us on 
balance as serving a deterrent and retributive function similar to a criminal fine." Id. at 
1205. 
ua See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989). 
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ishment does not remedy a loss. It "serves the twin aims of retribu-
tion and deterrence."124 "Loss" for this purpose is not bounded by 
the traditional definition of compensatory damages. It is a much 
broader notion, defined by all the government's costs.l211 The Su-
preme Court recently affirmed those two points in decisions 
outside the tax area. No one yet has brought them into the section 
162(0 analysis. 
a. More-than-compensatory Does Not Mean Punitive 
Court and administrative decisions under section 162(0 improp-
erly conclude that when a remedy consists of other than "compen-
satory damages," the purpose must be to punish the defendant. lse 
That proposition is false. Damages exist that resist the classical 
definition of compensatory damages because they exceed ordinary 
notions of compensation, yet damages also exist that do not match 
with the traditional definition of punitive damages because they do 
not punish. The Supreme Court recently dubbed these damages as 
"damages in the 'gray' zone."127 
The false dichotomy drawn between compensatory damages and 
punishment requires the taxpayer to prove that the damages paid 
to a government were compensatory, a more onerous burden than 
showing that the damages were not-punitive. Such a requirement 
construes section 162(0 as if it read, "No deduction shall be al-
lowed under subsection (a) for any not-compensatory payment of 
damages to a government for the violation of any law." The source 
, •• Id. at 448 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963» . 
... Id. at 449 . 
... The Tax Court's phrasing of the issue in one § 162(0 case is illustrative of the im-
proper compensatory/punitive dichotomy: "Where a payment ultimately serves each of 
these purposes, i.e., law enforcement (nondeductible) and compensation (deductible), our 
task is to determine which purpose the payment was designed to serve." Waldman v. Com-
missioner, 88 T.C. 1384, 1387 (1987) (citing S & B Restaurant, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 
T.C. 1226, 1232 (1980». In Waldman the court held that restitution was not deductible 
because it should be treated as a criminal fine; and if regarded as a civil exaction, it is not-
deductible because compensation is not its primary purpose. In True v. United States, 894 
F.2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 1990), the Tenth Circuit implied that a penalty would be not-
deductible unless it was "primarily compensatory." Even some courts finding exactions de-
ductible embrace the dic~otomy; they conclude that the exaction is deductible because it is 
compensatory (rather than not-punitive). See, e.g., Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 
673 ("Our review ... convinces us that Stephens' restitution payment was more compen-
satory than punitive in nature."). 
117 Molzof v. United States, 112 S.Ct 711, 716 (1992). 
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of the inversion likely lies in the Treasury regulations which pur-
port to read section 162(0 as allowing a deduction for damages 
paid to a government only if they are compensatory damages.12s 
In Molzo! v. United States,129 the Government similarly at-
tempted to define "punitive damages" as "more-than-compensa-
tory" to limit its liability in tort.180 The Court held against the 
Government concluding that the Government's argument incor-
rectly read the exclusion of punitive damages as an inclusion only 
of compensatory damages.181 The Treasury regulations under sec-
tion 162(0, and the decisions concluding that only compensatory 
damages are not-punitive for section 162(0 purposes, commit the 
same error that the Government commits in Molzot. That is, they 
1" See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The Treasury regulations by example pro-
vide that damages paid to a government under § 4A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15a 
(1988) do not constitute a fme or penalty. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(2) (1975). Until 1990, 
§ 4A of the Clayton Act provided for single damages recovery by the United States as anti-
trust plaintiff, while private antitrust plaintiffs recover treble damages under § 4 of the 
Clayton Act. Section 5 of the Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990 extended the treble dam-
ages recovery to the United States. Pub. L. No. 101-588, 104 Stat. 2879, 2880 (1990). The 
Treasury regulations have not been amended. Consequently, they literally provide that a 
defendant may deduct a treble damages antitrust payment to the United States. This de-
duction is inconsistent with the disallowance of § 162(g) of the Code which prohibits deduc-
tion of two-thirds of treble damages paid under § 4 to a private plaintiff if the defendant 
has been convicted on a related antitrust violation. 
"8 112 S. Ct. 711 (1992). 
110 Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States qualifiedly waives sovereign 
immunity for certain torts, "but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or tor 
punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988) (emphasis added). At issue in Molzot was 
whether (1) damages for medical care that would duplicate free medical services already 
being provided by a veterans' hospital and (2) damages for the loss of enjoyment of life were 
"punitive damages" and therefore not recoverable in a medical malpractice action against 
the United States. 
111 Molzot, 112 S. Ct. at 716. The Court stated: 
Id. 
The statutory language suggests that to the extent a plaintiff may be entitled to dam-
ages that are not legally considered 'punitive damages,' but which are for some reason 
above and beyond ordinary notions of compensation, the United States is liable for 
them 'in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual.' These 
damages in the 'gray' zone are not by defmition 'punitive damages' barred under the 
Act. In the ordinary case in which an award of compensatory damages is subse-
quently reduced on appeal, one does not say that the jury or the lower court mistak-
enly awarded 'punitive damages' above and beyond the actual compensatory dam-
ages. It is simply a matter of excessive or erroneous compensation. Excessiveness 
principles affect only the amount, and not the nature, of the damages that may be 
recovered. The term 'punitive damages,' on the other hand, embodies an element of 
the defendant's conduct that must be proved before such damages are awarded. 
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interpret an exclusion of "punitive damages" from deductibility as 
an inclusion in deductibility of only "compensatory damages" 
without acknowledging the existence of the "gray zone." 
b. Only When Civil Damages Exceed "All the Costs" of a Gov-
ernment Does the Payment Punish the Payor 
Damages that are more-than-compensatory are not necessarily 
punitive. Damages are intended to punish only if they exceed "all 
the costs" of the government. The Supreme Court in United 
States v. Halper132 established the "all the costs" limit deciding 
that, for purposes of the prohibition against double jeopardy, a 
state-invoked civil remedy punishes to the extent the remedy ex-
. ceeds "all the Government's costs." 
Halper had submitted sixty-five claims to Medicare for reim-
bursement at the rate of $12 per claim when the medical service 
properly was reimbursable at only $3 per claim. Consequently, 
Halper was convicted on sixty-five counts of defrauding the Gov-
ernment, sentenced to imprisonment, and fined. 
The Government then sued Halper under 31 U.S.C. § 3729, the 
Federal False Claims Act ("FFCA"). Under the FFCA in effect at 
the time of Halper's fraudulent acts, a person defrauding the 
United States was "liable to the United States Government for a 
civil penalty of $2,000, a sum equal to 2 times the amount of dam-
ages the Government sustains because of the act of that person, 
and costs of the civil action."133 Having violated the FFCA 65 sepa-
rate times, Halper appeared subject to a statutory penalty exceed-
ing $130,000. Because the Government had already jailed and fined 
Halper for his acts of fraud, the Court considered "whether the 
statutory penalty authorized by the civil False Claims Act, under 
. which Halper is subject to liability of $130,000 for false claims oth-
erwise amounting to $585, constitutes a second 'punishment' for 
u. 490 u.s. 435 (1989). 
, .. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (Supp. II 1984). The Act was amended by the False Claims Amend-
ments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153, to increase the civil penalty to "not 
less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 plus 3 times the amount of damages which the 
Government sustains because of the act of that person," and "the costs of a civil action 
brought to recover any such penalty or damages.'" 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (1988). Had 
Halper been found liable under the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, the civil penalty 
would have amounted to more than $326,775. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 438 n.3, 450 n.9. 
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the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. "134 The Court concluded 
that the Government improperly punished Halper a second time 
and found that the fixed damages penalty exceeded "all the Gov-. 
ernment's costs" resulting from Halper's frauds. u6 
The Court did not determine the amount of "all the Govern-
ment's costs," but it remanded the issue for a fact finding. How-
ever, the Court did offer some guidance on making the "all the 
Government's cost" determination. The Court acknowledged that 
"it would be difficult if not impossible in many cases for a court to 
determine the precise dollar figure at which a civil sanction has 
accomplished its remedial purpose of making the Government 
whole, but beyond which the sanction takes on the quality of pun-
ishment."us Consequently, the Court made two observations 
before crafting a flexible rule. First, the Court noted that "a civil 
remedy does not rise to the level of 'punishment' merely because 
Congress provided for civil recovery in excess of the Government's 
actual damages."l3? Second, the Court "recognized that in the ordi-
nary case fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages provisions can be 
said to do no more than make the Government whole."us The 
Court then adopted a rule of reason: civil damages recovered by a 
government are punishment when the damages bear "no rational 
relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its 
loss."139 
In Halper, the Court was confronted with the same issue 
presented by the section 162(f) cases, i.e., when does a state-in-
voked civil remedy punish the defendant? Consider the situation 
after remand in Halper. The district court will decide "all the Gov-
ernment's loss" caused by Halper and enter judgment for that 
amount. When Halper pays the judgment, no portion should be 
. denied deduction under section 162(f) because Halper has not been 
punished. However, Halper clearly will be forced to pay more-' 
than-compensatory damages. Under the Fifth Amendment, dam-
ages more-than-compensatory but less than all-the-costs do not 
constitute punishment. The all-the-costs limit should define when 
... Halper, 490 U.S. at 441. 
.at! Id. at 448-49 . 
• at! Id. at 449 . 
•• 7 Id. at 442. 
... Id. at 449 . 
••• Id. 
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damages punish for purposes of section 162(0.140 
Last Term, the Court affirmed Halper's pervasive definition of 
punishment, applying it in Austin v. United States141 to conclude 
that civil forfeitures punish because they "cannot fairly be said 
solely to serve a remedial purpose."142 The Court consequently 
concluded that, although civil forfeitures may punish, the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits them from punishing excessively. 
Integration of the Court's decisions in Halper, Molzo!, and Aus-
tin demonstrates that the Court has placed monetary exactions 
along a continuum of increasing severity: compensation, remedy, 
punishment, excessive punishment. Molzo! addresses the compen-
sation/remedy border, Halper the remedy/punishment border, and 
Austin the punishment/excessive punishment border. 
For section 162(0 purposes, the Halper boundary is determina-
tive. Halper establishes that punishment begins at the point where 
the damages paid by the defendant exceed "all the costs" resulting 
from the defendant's illegal conduct. 
But what are "all the costs?" Two complementary models de-
scribe governmental regulation of conduct by economic coercion.148 
A "price" is a payment of money in exchange for the opportunity 
.. 0 In Halper, "punishment" was interpreted for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's pro-
hibition of double jeopardy. However, for the purposes of § 162(0 "punishment" could have 
a different meaning. There is a strong argument that the definition of punishment by civil 
monetary exaction should be the same in both contexts. Consider the following possibility: 
on remand, the Government accounts for all its "damages and costs," and the district court 
decides that such amount is $35,000. By definition, $35,000 is the maximum amount that 
the Government may collect from Halper; one dollar more crosses the line into punishment. 
Suppose that this Article's approach is rejected, and instead the Treasury regulations' 
disallowance of more-than-compensatory damages is applied so that deduction of some por-
tion of the $35,000 payment is denied. The question then becomes whether the amount 
denied deduction as being more-than-compensatory imposes additional punishment for 
double jeopardy purposes. Has the carefully drawn line been crossed? Note that absent ap-
plication of § 162(0, Halper would appear entitled to deduct the payment as an itemized 
deduction under §§ 162 and 63 because it is attributable to his trade or business of per-
forming services for his employer: As an itemized deduction, it would be subject to certain 
limits like the two percent floor of § 67 and the overall limitation on itemized deductions of 
§ 68. Nonetheless, Halper could lower his taxes by a deduction, and its denial could, per-
haps should, be considered punishment for double jeopardy purposes. In Halper's case, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause may require that "punishment" be construed identically in both 
contexts. 
141 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) . 
... Id. at 2806, 2810. The Court emphasized the point in a footnote indicating that a 
specific forfeiture shown to be solely remedial is not punishment. Id. at 2812 n.14 . 
... Cooter, supra note 96, at 1524-25. 
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to perform a permitted act. A price is intended to force an actor to 
pay for the external costs that his socially useful conduct imposes 
on others. While the activity may continue, the price shifts the re-
sultant costs of the activity from society to the actor, and he inter-
nalizes negative externalities. In contrast, a "sanction" is a detri-
ment imposed for doing what is forbidden. Sanctions dissuade the 
actor from engaging in the sanctioned conduct by imposing a sig-
nificantly disproportionate increase in the expected cost of that 
conduct. 
Professor John Coffee suggests that the price/sanction division 
should define when economic coercion punishes. A defendant pay-
ing a price is not being punished, but a defendant paying a sanc-
tion is. The immediate consequence of Coffee's conclusion is that a 
civil defendant who pays a price has not been punished and there-
fore is not entitled to any criminal process protection.144 Professor 
Kenneth Mann debates Coffee's approach and argues that the pay-
ment of more-than-compensatory damages constitutes punish-
ment. A defendant who pays such damages should be entitled to 
some, but not all, process due criminal defendants.141i 
Mann and Coffee's debate about due process, Halper's double 
jeopardy decision, and section 162(f) all seek- to define the same 
issue: when does the payment of damages to a government punish 
the payor? Mann's approach mirrors that of the Treasury under 
section 162(f). Both conclude that the payment of more-than-com-
pensatory damages punishes. However, Coffee and the Supreme 
Court in Halper take the position that some greater measure of 
damages is required. 
Halper defines the measure at which damages become punish-
ment as the point at which a monetary penalty exceeds "all the 
Government's costs." Coffee interprets it as the aggregate external 
social costs caused by the defendant's conduct so it is possible that 
Coffee's definition encompasses a larger set of costs. Whether "all 
the costs" means "all the external social costs" is not as important 
in applying section 162(f) as is the realization that "all the costs" 
significantly exceeds compensatory damages. Both the Treasury 
Regulation promulgated under section 162(f) and the courts that 
have deCided that more-than-compensatory damages are punitive 
... Coffee, supra note 70, at 1883-85. 
1 .. Mann, supra note 41, at 1869-71. 
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adopt an insupportably expansive view of punishment. 
c. Does Section 162(f) Deny the Deduction of More-than-com-
pensatory Damages Paid to a Government? 
The Tax Court is the only court to address this point and has 
applied section 162(f) in situations in which taxpayers have paid 
more-than-compensatory damages to a government. The Tax 
Court cases addressing this issue have been inconsistent. One Tax 
Court case authoritatively denied deduction of the more-than-com-
pensatory portion of a double-damages remedy paid to a govern-
ment, but a later Tax Court case allowed deduction of the entire 
amount of a double-damages remedy. These cases appear to be 
irreconcilable. 
In Tucker v. Commissioner,146 the Tax Court disallowed deduc-
tion of the "double" portion of a double-damages remedy. Because 
Tucker participated in a strike against her employer, she became 
liable for a statutory penalty equal to twice her daily rate of pay 
for each day that she was out of work because of the strike.1ol7 The 
penalty was collected in two steps: (1) she received no pay for the 
days she was absent; and (2) subsequent wages were diminished by 
an amount equal to the pay foregone during the strike days. The 
Tax Court first concluded that the amount withheld in step (2) 
was includable in Tucker's income and then denied Tucker's de-
duction of the penalty under Section 162(f).148 
In Middle Atlantic Distributors, Inc. v. Commissioner/ol9 the 
... 69 T.C. 675 (1978) . 
... Section 210(1) of the New York Civil Service Law prohibits a public employee from 
engaging in a strike. Section 210(2)(a), headed "violations and penalties," provides that a 
public employee violating the prohibition shall be liable, under § 210(2)(g), as follows: 
Not earlier than thirty nor later than ninety days following the date of such determi-
nation [that the employee violated the prohibition of strikesl, the chief fIscal offIcer 
of the government involved shall deduct from the compensation of each such public 
employee an amount equal to twice his daily rate of pay for each day or part thereof 
that it was determined that he had violated this subdivision; such rate of pay to be 
computed as of the time of violation. In computing such deduction, credit shall be 
allowed for amounts already withheld from such employee's compensation on account 
of his absence from work or other withholding of services on such day or days. 
N.Y. Civ. Servo Law § 210(2)(g) (McKinney 1983 and Supp. 1993). 
The pertinent part of the statute has not been amended since the events occurring in 
Tucker. See Tucker, 69 T.C. at 677 n.2 (describing operation quoted above). 
, •• Tucker, 69 T.C. at 681-82. 
, •• 72 T.C. 1136 (1979). 
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Tax Court reached the opposite result when the taxpayer paid 
double damages to the Customs Service. Middle Atlantic paid 
$100,000 to the Customs Servi~e in settlement of a statutory "pen-
alty against goods" for importing goods by means of false state-
ments. The court concluded that the "penalty against goods" was 
only "reimbursement for lost revenue and other damages" because 
the Customs Service had a policy of reducing the penalty, origi-
nally for the goods or their full value, to an amount equal to reve-
nue IOSS.1110 The Tax Court did not identify the "other damages" 
besides lost customs revenue for which the penalty reimbursed. 
Thus it appears that the double damages consisted of lost customs 
revenue and a "penalty" equal to such revenue. Yet, the Tax Court 
allowed a deduction for the full amount. 1111 
After Halper, the payment of more-than-compensatory damages 
should not be viewed as punishment for purposes of section 162(f) 
of the Code. While the line at which punishment is reached is not 
bright; Halper states "that in the ordinary case fixed-penalty-plus-
double-damages provisions can be said to do no more than make 
the Government whole."1112 Consequently, after Halper, the exac-
tions in both Tucker and Middle Atlantic clearly should be de-
ductible; indeed, the only unresolved question is how much more 
than fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages may a government re-
cover without punishing the payor? 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO Two 
SITUATIONS 
Examination of two situations for which application of section 
162(f) of the Code presently is unresolved supports arguments for 
two important points regarding section 162(f) analysis: (1) recog-
10., Id. at 1144 . 
... In Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 15 (1967), the Tax Court consid-
ered whether a payment to the United States Government in settlement of an FFCA claim 
was nondeductible because the deduction would frustrate sharply deimed public policy. As 
indicated in Part I, § 162(f) essentially restates that rule. In Grossman, the court allowed 
the deduction in full concluding that the deduction under the facts of that case would not 
frustrate public policy and finding the settlement to be in the nature of damages for breach 
of contract and therefore not-punitive. However, the court went to great length to draw and 
support a conclusion that the eventual settlement amount, $100,000, did not exceed the 
actual economic damages alleged by the government. It strongly implied that damages in 
excess of such amount would have been a not-deductible penalty. Id. at 27-29. 
I •• 490 U.S. at 449. 
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nizing the hierarchy within the courts' reasoning and (2) changing 
the definition of punishment used in nature-of-the-remedy analy-
sis from any "not-compensatory" remedy to any remedy exceeding 
"all the costs" of the violation. The two relevant situations that 
will be discussed are: (1) restitution ordered in a criminal case and 
(2) settlements with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
"SEC"). 
A. Restitution Ordered in a Criminal Case 
Three cases have decided whether restitution paid by convicted 
defendants to victims of their crimes is deductible. The courts' 
conclusions widely vary. The federal district court in Spitz v. 
United States I 1>3 succinctly concluded that section 162(f) of the 
Code did not. deny deduction of restitution: 
The payment does not satisfy the criteria set forth in § 162(f). It is 
not a fine. Neither is it a penalty since it was payment of an 
amount due and owing. Finally, although ~he payment was fun-
neled through the State Department of Public Welfare, it was paid 
to [the victim] Fosshage, not "to a government" within the mean-
ing of § 162(f).1I1. 
Conversely, in Waldman v. Commissioner,m the Tax Court and 
the Ninth CircuitI 1>6 denied a deduction because criminal convic-
tion is a condition precedent to imposing restitution. Both courts 
essentially treated restitution for tax purposes as a criminal fine. 
In the alternative, the Tax Court applied its civil penalty analy-
sis. The court decided that, under California law, restitution is not-
compensatory, but instead it enforces the law and therefore is not-
deductible. 11>7 The Tax Court's facile civil penalty analysis equated 
the purpose of every remedy - enforcing the law - with the goal 
of punishing, a goal which is characteristic of only certain reme-
dies. The court thus applied a false dichotomy of punishment and 
compensation. Both of the Tax Court's conclusions which were de-
.. a 432 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Wis. 1977). 
, .. Id. at 149-50 . 
.. a 88 T.C. 1384 (1987), affd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988). 
, .. Waldman v. Commissioner, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988). The entire text of the Ninth 
Circuit's order reads: "We affirm the judgment substantially for the reasons stated by the 
Tax Court in its opinion in 88 T.C. 1384 (1987)." 
107 Waldman, 88 T.C. at 1388 (quoting Huff v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 804, 824 (1983». 
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rived from its analogies of civil penalties are erroneous. First, en-
forcement of the law and punishment are not coextensive. All rem-
, edies enforce the law. Second, the words "not-compensatory" and 
"punitive" are not coextensive. Finally, California restitution is 
not-punitive because its measure is always loss to the victim. 
To support its assertion that restitution is not-compensatory, 
the Tax Court relied upon quotations from two California Supreme 
Court cases. The court quoted People v. Lent/58 for the proposi-
tion that the measure of the amount of restitution "need not be 
limited to the transaction or amounts for which the defendant is 
actually convicted,"159 and People v. Richardslso for the assertion 
that "[r]estitution or reparation is not a substitute for a civil ac-
tion to recover damages."lsl The first proposition, while true, does 
not establish the fact that restitution punishes. The second pro-
position is false because the Tax Court quoted the California Su-
preme Court out of context. 
Lent and Richards decide an issue at the margin of restitution 
law in California. The two ~ases involve an interesting and ex-
traordinary situation in which a defendant charged with two 
counts of fraud is convicted of one count, acquitted of the other, 
and ordered to pay restitution upon both counts. lSi Both cases 
hold that a sentencing court may order a defendant to pay a third 
party for losses not caused by the defendant's crime only if the 
sentencing judge makes a specific finding that either the defend-
ant's behavior in the collateral transactions or his testimony re-
garding such transactions show a dishonest state of mind compara-
ble to that for which he was convicted. ISS The court reasoned that 
only in such circumstances may the defendant properly be re-
quired to choose between accepting incarceration' and materially 
correcting a wrong that he may not have committed.ls4 
IN 541 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1975) .• 
1 •• Waldman, 88 T.C. at 1388 (citing Lent, 541 P.2d at 548). 
180 552 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1976). 
181 Waldman, 88 T.C at 1387 (quoting Richards, 552 P.2d at 100-01) . 
... The Tax Court's citation to Lent and Richards as cases that are generally descriptive 
of the law of restitution in California is doubly curious. First, there was no suggestion that 
Waldman's restitution order included transactions for which Waldman had not pled guilty. 
Second, the Tax Court tainted all restitution in California because of its possible nonde-
ductibility in marginal cases. 
loa Richards, 552 P.2d at 102-03; Lent, 541 P.2d at 548. 
184 Richards, 552 P.2d at 100. The Richards court indicated that, in Lent, the sentencing 
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Even in those two extraordinary cases the expansion occurs only 
in the class of victims. The measure of restitution remains the 
same: loss imposed on another individual.181! California restitution, 
both in the main and at the margin as defined by Lent and Rich-
ards, is not-punitive because the measure of loss always is damage 
to victims, not retribution or deterrence. 
The quotation from Richards, "Restitution or reparation is not a 
substitute for a civil action to recover damages,"188 allegedly sup-
ported the proposition that restitution never can substitute a civil 
action. However, the California Supreme· Court used that state-
ment only to justify its rule that restitution ordinarily should not 
include losses for which the defendant is not convicted. Restitution 
when ordered and paid in ordinary and extraordinary cases is a 
substitute for a civil action for civil claims. 
In 1982, after Waldman had paid his restitution but before the 
Tax Court had decided the case, section 1203.04 was added to the 
California Penal Code. The provision stated that "damages com-
pensated for by restitution shall not be actionable in a civil suit 
against the defendant."187 It recodified prior law and is consistent 
with a far-ranging codification and expansion of restitution in Cali-
fornia. This expansion includes the 1982 statutes, adoption of Pro-
-position 8 by statewide initiative on June 8, 1982, and statutory 
enactments pursuant to Proposition 8.188 Consequently, in Califor-
judge found a dishonest state of mind so the extraordinary restitution there was proper. In 
Richards, the court found that the defendant did not possess a dishonest state of mind. [d. 
at 103. Consequently, the court reversed the order requiring Richards to pay restitution to 
the victim on the charge for which he had been acquitted. Id. 
1" The statutory authorization for restitution in Waldman's case, California Penal Code 
§ 1203.1, allows courts granting probation to require "that amends may be made to society 
for the breach of the law, [and) for any injury dgne to any person resulting from that breach 
.... " Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1993). As such, the court always must tie the 
amount of restitution to the injury done to a person. The major goal of § 1203.1 is to "serve 
the salutary purpose of making a criminal understand that he has harmed not merely soci-
ety in the abstract but also individual human beings and that he has a responsibility to 
make them whole." Richards, 552 P.2d at 100-01. 
1" Waldman, 88 T.C. at 1387 (quoting Richards, 552 P.2d at 100-01). 
181 1982 Cal. Stat. 5403 (adding Cal. Penal Code § 1203.04). In 1983, California Penal 
Code § 1203.04 was repealed and reenacted in substantially similar form. Presently, 
§ 1203.04(d) provides, "Restitution collected pursuant to this section shall be credited to 
any other judgments obtained by the victim against the defendant arising out of the crime 
for which the defendant was convicted." Cal. Penal Code § 1203.04(d) (West Supp. 1993). 
18. California Civil Procedure Code § 352.5, enacted in 1976, provides that the statute of 
limitations is suspended for the time during which an order for restitution is in effect with 
HeinOnline -- 13 Va. Tax Rev. 316 1993-1994
316 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 13:271 
nia, the measure of restitution is consistently loss to the· victim, 
and restitution always substitutes for a civil action. Therefore, res-
titution is not-punitive and is thus neither a "fine" nor "similar 
penalty." 
Because restitution is grounded as a remedy for victims, another 
indeterminacy to applying section 162(f) of the Code is added. It is 
unclear whether restitution is remitted to a-victim or "paid to a 
government." In Waldman, after incorrectly deciding that Wald-
man's restitution was both a "fine" and a "similar penalty," the 
Tax Court turned to the issue of whether the penalty was "paid to 
a government." The court stated that "the characterization of a 
payment for purposes of section 162(f) depends on the origin of 
the liability giving rise to it"169 and then premised its assertion on 
a tautology. The court reiterated the same reasons it had used to 
reach its decision that restitution was a "fine" and a "similar pen-
alty." It then concluded that "[p]etitioner's payments of restitu-
tion were thus in satisfaction of his criminal liability to the 
State."170 
Such reasoning renders "paid to a government" a nullity because 
all fines and similar penalties by definition are paid to a govern-
ment. The court bolstered its conclusion with an inapposite cita-
tion to Bailey v. Commissioner171 in which the Tax Court and the 
Sixth Circuit concluded that an amount paid by Bailey to plain-
tiffs in a class action was not deductible under section 162(f) of the 
Code. 
Outside the original class action, a federal district court imposed 
a penalty for the violation of a Federal Trade Commission 
("FTC") order. The amount of the penalty was calculated princi-
pally with regard to culpability, not with respect to a loss to any 
person.172 The district court had plenary authority over the pay-
respect to the acts or omissions giving rise to the civil liability. See also Phillip E. Hassman, 
Annotation, Propriety of Condition of Probation Which Requires Defendant Convicted of 
Crime of Violence to Make Reparation to Injured Victim, 79 A.L.R.3d 976, 992-93 (describ-
ing the case of People v. Stacey, 212 N.E. 2d 286 (Ill. App. 1965), in which the court indi-
cated that restitution does not affect victim's right to institute a civil action, but a set-off 
might be ordered for restitution paid). 
1 •• Waldman, 88 T.C. at 1389 (citing Bailey v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 
1985». 
no Id. at 1389. 
171 756 F.2d 44 (6th. Cir. 1985), affg an unpublished order of the Tax Court. 
17. The mandate for districts courts to follow after finding 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) culpability is: 
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ment's destination and subsequently decided to direct the penalty 
to the victims. This re-direction may have funneled the money 
paid as a penalty to private parties, but it did not alter the pen-
alty's status as having been paid to the government. In contrast, in 
Waldman, the government is not the recipient, and is at most a 
mere conduit of restitution to the victims. The sentencing court 
does not decide the destination of restitution; it determines only 
the amount of the victim's loss. California law requires that resti-
tution be forwarded to the victim.178 In short, in Bailey, the Gov-
ernment recovered the penalty as principal and redistributed it to 
victims. In Waldman, California recovered restitution as the agent 
of the victim. 
In the Tax Court's next restitution case, Stephens v. Commis-
sioner,174 the court concluded that Stephens' payment of restitu-
tion was nondeductible because it "was made as a result of a crimi-
nal conviction and . . . it was ordered in lieu of an additional 
prison term and as a condition of probation."l71~ The Tax Court did 
not alternatively apply its civil penalty analysis; thus, it affirmed 
Waldman's first holding that restitution is nondeductible because 
"In determining the amount of such a civil penalty, the court shall take into account the 
degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to 
continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require." 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(m)(1)(C). 
178 At the time that Waldman paid his restitution and the Tax Court decided the case, 
California Penal Code § 1203.1 provided, in pertinent part, "The court shall consider 
whether the defendant as a condition of probation shall make restitution to the victim or 
the Indemnity Fund if assistance has been granted to the victim . . . ." Cal. Penal Code 
§ 1203.1 (West 1982). The Waldman court cited that section. 88 T.C. at 1388. The present 
version of § 1203.1 is substantially similar in pertinent part. Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1 
(West Supp. 1993) . 
... 93 T.C. 108 (1989), rev'd, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990). At the threshold, the Tax Court 
decided whether the governing provision was § 162 of the Code or § 165 of the Code. It 
concluded that § 165 governed because restitution is not an "ordinary and necessary" busi-
ness expense. Id. at 111-12 (citing Mannette v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 990, 992-94 (1978» 
(an expense must be ordinary and necessary before it is deductible under § 162(a), without 
which § 162(0 by its terms never can apply). The Tax Court did not address why in Wald-
man § 162 was held directly to govern, with no mention of § 165. 
After deciding that § 165 and not § 162(0 controlled, the Tax Court made the point 
academic by incorporating § 162(0 into § 165, concluding (1) that public policy can disal-
low deductions under § 165, and (2) the public policy disallowance under § 165 is at least as 
broad as the limitations contained in § 162(0. Id. at 112. The court ultimately reduced the 
issue to whether Stephens' payment of restitution would be deductible in light of "the con-
siderations involved in applying section 162(0," Id. 
170 Id. at 113. 
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it constitutes a criminal fine.178 
The Second Circuit reversed,177 identifying two considerations 
and emphasizing that they combined to support the conclusion 
that Stephens' restitution was neither a fine nor paid to a govern-
ment. The court expressly ignored the issue of whether either con-
sideration alone would suffice. It first concluded that Stephens' 
restitution payment was "more compensatory than punitive in na-
ture."l78 The court examined the transcript of the sentencing and 
found that restitution was ordered after sentencing Stephens to 
five years in prison with a fine for each count. It surmised that the 
judge added the restitution and an accompanying additional sus-
pended five-year prison term primarily to reimburse the victim for 
10ss"'79 The Second Circuit distinguished Waldman because Wald-
man's entire sentence was suspended on condition that he make 
restitution, thus indicating to the Second Circuit that the purpose 
of Waldman's payment was equally compensatory and punitive. 
The Second Circuit then found that Stephens' payment was made 
to the victim and "not to a government. "180 
The Second Circuit stands at odds with both the Tax Court and 
the Ninth Circuit on the application of section 162(f) of the Code 
to restitution. Stephens offered a superficial distinction of Wald-
man - all of Waldman's sentence was suspended upon payment of 
restitution while only part of Stephens' was - but the distinction 
is beside the point. The issue is whether the restitution itself was 
intended to punish the payor, not whether punitive intent also ex-
". Had the Tax Court applied its civil penalty analysis in Stephens, it would have been 
forced to confront an important distinction between the collateral repercussions of Ste-
phens' restitution and the Tax Court's view of the collateral consequences of Waldman's 
restitution. In Stephens, the Tax Court could not have concluded that Stephens' payment 
. was not a substitute for a civil action because the payment actually was made in compro-
mise of two civil actions filed by the victim. The settlement payment appears collaterally to 
have satisfied the restitutionary order against Stephens. 
"7 Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C. 108 (1989). 
Before the Second Circuit, the parties apparently agreed that § 165 of the Code governed. 
Id. at 670. Therefore, the court did not address the flrSt issue confronted by the Tax Court. 
In construing § 165, the Second Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's conclusion that 
§ 162(0 is relevant in determining whether restitution is deductible under § 165 but did 
not agree that § 162(0 precluded the deduction. 905 F.2d at 672. 
17. Id. at 672-73. This conclusion again shows the pervasive nature of the false dichotomy 
of compensation and punishment. 
17. Id. at 673. 
180 Id. at 673-74. 
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isted with respect to some other remedies associated with the case. 
A search for punitive intent leads to the hierarchical analysis de-
veloped in Part II. Under the hierarchial analysis, a direct declara-
tion that restitution is (or is not) intended to punish found in the 
statute, in the legislative history, or in the specific facts of the 
case, would govern. However, such direct declarations usually are 
not present. 
Section 162(f) of the Code normally should not be utilized to 
deny the deduction of restitution payments because examination 
of the nature of the remedy discloses that restitution is not-puni-
tive. First, restitution is not paid to a government; it is disbursed 
to the victim. The use of a court or probation office as a financial 
intermediary or escrow agent cannot affect this conclusion. Second, 
the normal manner of computing restitution does not demonstrate 
that its payment is intended to punish; the measure of damages is 
based upon loss to the victim. Restitution may be contrasted to a 
fine: a fine is principally· measured with respect to deterrence or 
retribution while restitution is measured with respect to the vic-
tim's loss. Restitution normally does not serve the same purpose as 
a fine exacted under a criminal statute. Rather, it serves the same 
purpose as damages exacted under a tort claim. Section 162(f) of 
the Code assumes that punishment can occur in a civil suit; it 
should also recognize that reparation of damage can occur in a 
criminal suit. 
B. Civil Settlements with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
Civil settlements with the SEC offer fertile ground for future lit-
igation under section 162(f) of the Code because of the enormous 
increase in 1990 in the SEC's ability to seek and assess civil penal-
ties and the high dollar amount of such penalties.181 A recent set-
tlement of federal securities and other claims in Salomonl82 raises 
181 Big-ticket penalties often encourage litigation because taxpayers have a strong incen-
tive to avoid paying substantial fines. Note, however, that suits may involve small fmes even 
though we would expect that, for cost-benefit analysis reasons, taxpayers would not litigate 
the denial of deductions for modest penalties. For example, in one case, the penalty con-
sisted of only $1200. True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1201 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
u, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Salomon Inc and Salomon Brothers Inc, 92 
Civ. No. 3691 (RPP) (S.D. N.Y. 1992), Securities and Exchange Commission Litigation Re-
lease No. 13,246 (May 20, 1992), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Litrel File. The term 
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many section 162(f) issues. 
On August 9, 1991, Salomon announced that it had "uncovered 
irregularities and rule violations by its employees in connection 
with its submission of bids in certain auctions of Treasury securi-
ties."188 On May 20, 1992, the government declared a resolution of 
its investigations into the matter. The investigation resulted in the 
filing of a complaint by the SEC, the entry of a consent judgment 
by a federal district court, and the execution of a settlement agree-
ment between the United States and Salomon. 1M 
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Salomon agreed to make 
two payments totalling $290 million. A payment of $100 million 
was remitted to the registry of the court and a $190 million pay-
ment was sent to the U.S. Treasury. The amount paid into the 
court was used to create a fund for future private civil claims for 
compensatory damages arising from the activities alleged in the 
complaint. The funds channeled to the Treasury represented (1) a 
$122 million payment of civil penalties under the Securities En-
forcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 
("SERPSRA"), (2) a $55 million forfeiture to the Department of 
Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 6 and 18 
U.S.C. § 981(a)(l)(c), and (3) a $13 million payment to the United 
States for potential claims of the Department of Justice under 31 
U.S.C. § 3729, the FFCA, and common law.18G 
Salomon assessed the economic impact of the auction "irregular-
ities," including the settle'ment agreement, in the notes to its fi-
nancial statements. Salomon established and funded a reserve for 
. "damages, settlement costs, fines, penalties, legal expenses and 
other related costs" of $385 million and stated that the after-tax 
cost would be $300 million.188 Thus, it appears that Salomon be-
lieved that some portion of the $290 million paid under the settle-
Salomon is used to refer collectively to Salomon Brothers Inc and Salomon Inc, the subsidi-
ary and parent corporations, respectively. 
188 Id. at 4. 
184 Id. at 1. 
~li , 
188 During the 1991 third quarter, Salomon recorded a pre-tax charge of $200 million to 
establish the reserve, and indicated that such charge would cost $136 million after taxes. In 
the 1992 second quarter, Salomon added to the reserve with an additional pre-tax charge of 
$185 million and indicated that such additional charge would cost $164 million after taxes. 
Salomon Inc, Form lO-Q Quarterly Report Under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 7-8 (June 30, 1992), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Filing File. 
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ment agreement was deductible for federal income tax purposes. 187 
Whether in response to Solomon's notes in its financial state-
ment or some other source, the House Ways and Means Subcom-
mittee on Oversight apparently became aware that a portion of the 
$290 million payment would be deductible. Subcommittee Chair-
man J.J. Pickle called a hearing to review the settlement. Among 
the questions included in the hearing announcement was "[h]ow 
much, if any, of the settlement will Salomon Brothers be able to 
deduct from their taxes?"I88 At the September 29, 1992 hearing 
Representative Anthony presented the question of Salomon's de-
ductions to the Service's Assistant Chief Counsel for Income Tax 
and Accounting Glen Carrington. Carrington declined to answer 
the Representative's question citing the prohibition on federal em-
ployees' discussing particular taxpayer's cases.189 Carrington only 
generally addressed section 162(0 of the Code. He stated that: (1) 
deductibility turns on the "purpose" of the statute which created 
the penalty; (2) civil penalties that are "remedial" are deductible; 
and (3) civil penalties that are "punitive" are not deductible.190 
187 Calculating what portion of the $290 million payment Salomon believed deductible 
depends upon two unknowns: 1) Salomon's combined federal and state tax rate and 2) the 
portion of Salomon's expenses, in addition to the $290 million paid pursuant to the 'settle-
ment agreement, that is itself deductible. By making reasonable 888umptions, it becomes 
clear that Salomon believed that a significant portion of the $290 million payment is de-
ductible. Assuming that Salomon's combined federal and state income tax rate is 40% and 
that the entire amount by which the pre-tax charge exceeds the amount paid pursuant to 
the settlement agreement, $95 million ($385 million minus $290 million), is fully deductible, 
the $95 million in other payments would generate a tax deduction worth $38 million. Be-
cause the total tax benefit of the $385 million expense is $85 million, the $290 million pay-
ment would be expected to generate tax deductions worth $47 million. Using a 40 percent 
tax rate, that would mean that $117.5 million of the $290 million is considered deductible. 
Actually, it is likely that $113 million would be deductible: the $100 million civil claims fund 
and the $13 million paid to the United States for Federal False Claims Act and common law 
claims. 
188 Salomon Brothers' Agreement to Settle Federal Civil Charges Stemming From Its 
Role in 1991 Treasury Auction Scandal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the 
House Ways and Means Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Seas. 2-3 (1992). 
"8 This prohibition is found in § 6103(a) of the Code. Section 6103(a) states, in pertinent 
part: 
(a) General rule.- Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as 
authorized by this title,-(I) no officer or employee of the United States ... shall 
disclose any return or return information obtained by him in any manner in connec-
tion with his service as slich an officer or an employee or otherwise under the provi-
sions of this section. 
I.R.C. § 6103(a). 
100 Salomon Brothers' Agreement to Settle Federal Civil Charges Stemming From Its 
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Representative Anthony asked Carrington to further explain the 
remedial/punitive dichotomy, but Carrington could not because he 
was unfamiliar with the underlying purpose of the securities stat-
utes. Representative Anthony then asked the Service to address in 
writing the application of the remedial/punitive distinction to the 
claims settled in Salomon's case, but no written response was pro-
vided.191 The consensus reached during the hearing was that the 
$100 million claims fund payment would be deductible, and the 
remaining $190 million would lie in a gray area depending upon 
whether the payments were punitive or remedial. No definition of 
punitive or remedial was attempted by the Treasury or· the 
Committee. 
A deduction for the $100 million paid into the claims fund is 
highly likely because those funds would clearly not be categorized 
as a penalty; rather, they are compensatory damages paid to inves-
tors. Treatment of the other $190 million may be illuminated by 
applying the remedial/punitive distinction developed in this Arti-
cle to the SERPSRA claims, civil asset forfeitures, and FFCA and 
common-law claims. . 
1. Civil Penalties Under SERPSRA ($122 million) 
Salomon paid $122 million in civil penalties .under SERPSRA .. 
To decide whether that amount is deductible, the first factor in the 
hierarchal analysis is whether legislative intent demonstrates that 
SERPSRA civil penalties are intended to punish. The legislative 
history of SERPSRA indeed demonstrates such a punitive intent. 
SERPSRA worked a revolution in the SEC's enforcement pow-
ers by granting the SEC authority to go to court to seek civil pen-
alties against any person for violation of any securities law or regu-
lation.192 Prior to SERPSRA, the SEC's general enforcement tools 
Role in 1991 Treasury Auction Scandal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the 
House Ways and Means Comm., supra note 188, at 27. 
101 Id. at 29. The Hearing Report contains no written response from the Service and 
would have contained such a response if one had been provided prior to publication. In 
addition, a response was not otherwise provided to the Committee. Telephone Conversation 
with Patrick G. Heck, Assistant Counsel, Conimittee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on 
Oversight (June 28, 1993). 
102 Prior to SERPSRA's enactment in 1990, the SEC could seek civil money penalties 
only in insider trading cases. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 had given the 
power to seek civil penalties against persons engaged in insider trading. In 1988, the power 
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were limited to seeking injunctions and disgorgement orders. Con-
gress concluded that those enforcement means were inadequate be-
cause the threat of an injunction had very little deterrent effect 
and disgorgement required only that the violator give up his un-
lawful gains without any added cost.193 Dissatisfaction with the 
prior regime, in which the measure of damages was actual loss, re-
sulted in SERPSRA's grant of authority to seek or impose sub-
stantial money penalties determined principally without regard to 
loss. 
The size of a SERPSRA penalty is governed by a three-tier 
structure focusing upon the culpability of the violator and the 
harm or potential for harm caused.194 Within the three tiers for 
court-imposed penalties, the amount "shall be determined in light 
of the facts and circumstances.m911 For SEC-imposed penalties, the 
statutes provide six factors for the SEC to consider. The factors 
are: 
(1) whether the act or omission for which such penalty is assessed 
involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless dis-
regard of a regulatory requirement; 
(2) the harm to other persons resulting either directly or indirectly 
from such act or omission; 
(3) the extent to which any person was unjustly enriched, taking 
into account· any restitution made to persons injured by such 
behavior; 
(4) whether such person previously: (a) has been found by the 
SEC, another appropriate regulatory agency, or a self-regulatory 
was expanded to persons in authority positions ("controlling persons") who failed to take 
reasonable measures to prevent their "controlled persons" from engaging in insider trading. 
(SERPSRA additionally permits the SEC itself to assess civil penalties in SEC administra-
tive proceedings against SEC-regulated persons.) House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990, H.R. Rep. No. 616, 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1990), reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1383-84. 
lOa Id. at 17-19, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1382-86. Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990, S. 
Rep. No. 337, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-12 (1990) . 
... SERPSRA § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2) (Supp. III 1991) (for court-imposed penalties 
sought by the SEC pursuant to the 1933 Act); SERPSRA § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) 
(Supp. III 1991) (for court-imposed penalties sought by the SEC pursuant to the 1934 Act); 
SERPSRA § 202(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a) (Supp. III 1991) (for SEC-imposed penalties in 
SEC administrative proceedings). 
106 SERPSRA § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1991); SERPSRA § 201, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991). 
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organization to have violated the Federal securities laws, State se-
curities laws, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization; (b) has 
been enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction from violations 
of such laws or rules, or; (c) has been convicted by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction of violations of such laws or of any felony or 
misdemeanor described in section 15(b)(4)(B) of this title; 
(5) the need to deter such person and other persons from commit-
ting such acts or omissions; and 
(6) such other matters as justice may require.198 
Four of the six factors (factors 1, 3, 4, and 5) relate to the de-
fendant's conduct rather than to the loss caused. Only one factor 
(factor 2) relates to the loss caused. The principal purpose of the 
penalties, as determined by the manner of calculation described in 
the statute and legislative history, is to punish. Therefore, the 
amount of consideration paid under the settlement agreement allo-
cated to SERPSRA penalty claims ($122 million) wou,ld not be 
deductible. 
2. Forfeitures to the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture 
Fund Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 6 and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(c) 
($55 million) 
Section 162(f) of the Code technically does not apply to deduc-
tions for forfeitures of property to a government because forfeit-
ures are nondeductible under section 162(a).197 Forfeitures are de-
ductible, if at all, under section 165. A recent Tax Court case 
discerned a "unanimous line of authority" holding that property 
forfeited to a government is nondeductible under section 165.198 
Those decisions deny the deduction after concluding that (1) sec-
'86 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c) (Supp. III 1991). Although not required by statute, federal courts 
would be expected to use criteria very similar to those for SEC-imposed penalties when 
setting court-imposed penalties. The only other statutory difference between court-imposed 
and SEC-imposed penalties (in addition to the absence of an affmnative statement of the 
six criteria) is that court-imposed penalties may exceed the tier limits if the "gross amount 
of the pecuniary gain to the defendant exceeds the tier limits." See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991). 
"1'7 Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C. 108 (1989). 
'8. Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 254 (1990) (citing Wood v. United States, 
863 F.2d 417, 420-422 (5th Cir. 1989); Gambina v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 826 (1988); Holt v. 
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 75 (1977); Bailey v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1030 (1989); 
Pring v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 958 (1989); Gillan v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1339 (1988); Styron v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1373 (1987). 
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tion 165 includes a general public policy disallowance of losses if 
the allowance of a deduction would frustrate a sharply defined na-
tional or state policy, and (2) allowance of a deduction for property 
forfeited to a government would frustrate a sharply-defined 
policy.l9S 
While there is no unanimous conclusion, the great weight of au-
thority'supp0rts the idea that a deduction under section 165 of the 
Code is denied for property forfeited to a government because al-
lowance of such a deduction would frustrate a sharply-defined na-
tional or state policy. Thus, consideration paid under the settle-
ment agreement allocated to forfeitures ($55 million) would not be 
deductible. 
3. Claims of the Department of Justice Under 31 U.S.C. § 3729 
and Under Common Law ($13 million) 
Under the FFCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, a person using a false state-
ment to obtain payment from the United States upon a fraudulent 
claim is "liable to the United States Government for a civil pen-
alty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 
times the amount of damages which the Government sustains . . . 
[plus] costs .... "200 The FFCA was at issue in United States v. 
Halper01 where the Court held that the Government's recovery 
constitutes punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause only to the extent that the recovery "bears no rational rela-
1 .. This Article examines § 165 only to the extent that it incorporates § 162(0 principles, 
and Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C. 108 (1989), at 43, 
is the only case that meaningfully addresses the issue. Section 165 is discussed here only to 
complete the analysis of the Salomon settlement agreement. There are three important is· 
sues to note about the § 165 cases. First, the argument that the general free-wheeling sword 
of public policy did not survive enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 has not thought-
fully been refuted. Second, the line of authority is not unanimous even within the Tax Court 
opinions. In Ramos v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 924 (1981), the taxpayer's boat was 
seized in the Bahamas for violating territorial fishing restrictions, and the § 165 loss deduc-
tion was permitted. Perhaps no "national or state policy" is offended when U.S. citizens 
violate foreign law and lose property. However, that position seems an unusual distinction, 
and the Tax Court has not yet harmonized Ramos with its other decisions. Third, the most 
defensible manner in which to deny the deduction under § 165 is to do so under the narrow 
grounds that the policy considerations embodied in § 162(0 deny the deduction because the 
measure of the penalty in a forfeiture action is not loss. The measure is the value of the 
property. 
100 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). 
101 490 U.S. 449 (1989). 
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tion to the goal of compensating the Government for its 
loss .... "202 
Part III of this Article argues that the Government's recovery 
should be considered punitive for purposes of section 162(f) of the 
Code only if it exceeds all the Government's costs. in Halper, the 
Government had to account for all of its costs in order to be 
awarded judgment against Halper in that amount. In Salomon, 
however, the burden of proving costs would be more difficult. Salo-
mon was not criminally punished, so the civil FFCA and common 
law claims constitutionally could punish and should be regarded as 
punishment to the extent that the consideration allocated to the 
FFCA and common law is not-remedial. Salomon would have the 
burden of proving "all the Government's costs" under the FFCA 
and common law claims, and Salomon might have difficulty ob-
taining evidence to prove the costs of another person. However, if 
Salomon could prove such costs of the Government, either through 
information obtained during settlement negotiations or by FOIA 
requests, Salomon should be entitled to deduct'the amount up to 
the Government's costs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When a defendant pays money to a government pursuant to a 
criminal charge, the payment is a fine, and it may not be deducted 
for federal income tax purposes. When a defendant pays damages 
to a government pursuant to a civil claim, the defendant cannot 
deduct the payment if it was intended as punishment. The pay-
ment of civil damages to a government is punitive if the govern-
ment has declared an intent to punish. Declaration of punitive in-
tent will be found in the statute under which the government 
made its claim, in the resolution of the particular case, or by infer-
ence from the manner by which the damages are calculated. 
For punitive purpose to be declared in a statute, legislative his-
tory, settlement agreement, or judgment, there must be a direct 
statement that the payment of the damages is intended to punish. 
Invocation of the "penalty" label in the heading or wording of a 
statute, settlement agreement, or judgment is not determinative, 
but certainly heightens the probability that a punitive declaration 
1.1 Halper, 490 U.S. at 449. 
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will be found. Absent a declaration, punitive purpose will be in-
ferred if the damages paid by the defendant exceed "all the costs" 
of a government or victim resulting from the acts giving rise to the 
remedy. If the damages exceed "all the costs," then the payment 
punishes, but only to the extent of the excess. The precise contours 
of the "all-the-costs" measure are not defined brightly. One com-
mentator has suggested that it includes all the external social costs 
of the defendant's conduct. "All-the-costs" at least encompasses 
the ordinary fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages remedy, which 
may have the greatest impact on the application of section 162(0, 
for it clearly demonstrates that the compensatory damages limit 
advanced by the Treasury Regulation and some courts is not sup-
portable. In the future, legislatures enacting penalties and govern-
ment officials prosecuting civil cases may more frequently declare 
directly their intent to punish, in which case the application of sec-
tion 162(0 will become straightforward. However, such direct dec-
larations may continue to be infrequent because of the propensity 
of legislatures to 'avoid any claim for heightened process in civil 
cases. Thus, courts deciding tax cases will have to consider more 
thoughtfully the issue of when the manner of computing civil dam-
ages shows that payment of those damages to a government consti-
tutes punishment for purposes of section 162(0. 
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